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ABSTRACT
At the upcoming May 1995 United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP")
Governing Council meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, delegates plan to initiate the
process to change the currently voluntary Prior Informed Consent ("PIC")
procedures for chemicals and pesticides of the Food and Agriculture
Organization ("FAQ") into a binding international convention. UNEP and FAO
representatives would like to complete negotiations by 1997. However, the
Nairobi meeting is not expected to result in the initiation of meaningful
negotiations of a pesticide convention due to the complexity of the issues
surrounding pesticide exports, the lack of adequate preparation and the
limited time scope expected for the negotiations, among other significant
problems.
This thesis reviews and questions current pesticide policies and
practices regarding exports between industrialized or developed countries
("DCs") to late developing countries ("LDCs") and concludes that existing
intergovernmental organizations and national and regional programs
concerned with pesticides are largely ineffective at protecting human
health and the environment. The research methodology of this thesis
included a review of: 1) current pesticide activities of United Nations
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
certain national and regional pesticide programs and policies; 2)
scientific literature regarding the human health and environmental
consequences of pesticide use, including new literature regarding the
health effects of estrogenic pesticides; and 3) review of literature on
international environmental negotiation theory, problems, and current
practices. The result is the development of recommendations for the
upcoming international negotiations regarding pesticides.
This thesis presents a proposal for the negotiation of a framework
convention which is phased in the following respects: 1) the outright ban
on the trade in banned and canceled pesticides; 2) the establishment of an
international regulatory system for all other pesticides traded; and 3) the
development of mechanisms to implement alternative, safe, pest management
practices, which incorporate existing and evolving sustainable agricultural
practices.

The successful negotiation of a framework convention prohibiting the
export of banned and canceled pesticides requires: 1) review of e
United Nations intergovernmental organizations concerned with pesticians >
determine their utility in the proposed convention; 2) modification of
certain United Nations environmental negotiation policies and practices; 3)
resolution of the "North-South" debate in the context of pesticide exports;
4) review of the problems associated with sovereignty; and 5) examination
of and elimination of lack of incentives to bargain.
Phased, parallel, country or regionally specific programs, to implement
safe, effective, alternative pest management practices based on principles
of sustainable agriculture are necessary. The design and implementation
of such programs is critical to the effectiveness of and compliance with
the proposed convention. Not only must the convention include
prohibitions, and, at a minimum, effective incentives to prevent chemical
producers from relocating their facilities and technology to non-party
nations and countries with less stringent chemical regulations; but, it
must include: 1) technology transfers and capacity building provisions to
allow the transition to alternative and safe pest management practices; 2)
"right-to know" or "toxic release inventory" reporting and monitoring
provisions to ensure that the individual governments and citizens have full
information regarding chemicals; and 3) provisions for sustainable
agricultural programs and policies.
Thus, the proposed convention entails a gradual, rather than immediate,
ban which includes targets and timetables for the implementation of safe,
sustainable pest management programs.
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I - Why A Pesticide
Convention Is Necessary and Inevitable; Chapter II - Justification for A
Pesticide Convention: Human Health and Environmental Consequences of
Pesticide Use and Abuse; Chapter III - The Role of Existing Institutions in
the Formulation of a Framework Convention on Pesticides; Chapter IV -
Negotiation Process and Procedure in the Pesticide Convention; Chapter V -
Design and Implementation Obstacles and Solutions in Negotiation of the
Pesticide Convention; Chapter VI - A Phased Approach to Compliance Under
the Pesticide Convention: Pesticide Regulation Coupled With A Sustainable
Agricultural Pest Management Scheme; Chapter VII - Conclusions and
Recommendations for the Negotiation of the Pesticide Convention.
This thesis concludes with some specific recommendations for the
negotiation of the pesticide convention, including, among the
recommendations for a phased agreement as above described, suggestions that
the negotiators review and borrow useful provisions (such as the financial
mechanism in the Global Environmental Facility and Joint Implementation) of
existing international agreements such as the Montreal Protocol and the
Framework Convention for Climate Change. Further, it provides some more
general recommendations with regard to the negotiation process itself.
Notably, this thesis did not conclude with the presentation of a model
agreement for the pesticide convention. As noted, any such model would
prove useless to the negotiators as all parties and interests have yet to
be identified at this early stage.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Nicholas Ashford
Title: Professor of Technology and Policy, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
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CHAPTER I - Why A Pesticide Convention Is Necessary
and Inevitable
I. Introduction
Of all the international agreements on environment and
development, only two directly address the question of
pesticides1 and pesticide exports. The most well known
operates as a voluntary system.2 This system is the United
Nations Environment Programme's Food and Agricultural
Organization's International Code of Conduct on the
Distribution and Use of Pesticides (hereafter the "Code").3
Adopted on November 19, 1985, its purpose is to set forth
responsibilities and establish voluntary standards of
conduct for all public and private entities engaged in or
affecting the distribution and use of pesticides,
particularly where there is no national law or where
I In this thesis, the term pesticide encompasses
herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, rodenticides, pesticides.
2 Pesticides designated as hazardous wastes may be subject
to the Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movements and Management of Hazardous
Wastes within Africa (the Bamako Convention), or the Convention
on the Control for the Conservation of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (the Basel Convention)
3 Charlotte Uram, International Regulation of the Sale and
Use of Pesticides, Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business, Vol. 10, 1990, p. 476-477.
inadequate ones exist to regulate pesticides. 4 The Code,
as amended, authorizes exports so long as there is prior
informed notification or consent ("PIC"). As the name
itself reveals, the Code is not intended to prohibit the
export of banned pesticides. As a voluntary mechanism, it
is not legally binding. "It was designed primarily to
protect those countries without adequate pesticide
regulation through a program of voluntary, cooperative
action by governments, pesticide manufacturers and
exporters, and non-governmental organizations such as public
interest groups. The voluntary aspect of the Code would
appear to be a serious flaw in the regulatory system, giving
rise to the question of whether the Code should be converted
to a treaty so that it will become a binding international
regulation." 5 However, conversion of the Code to a treaty,
4 Specifically, the Code seeks:
to promote practices which ensure efficient and safe use of
pesticides while minimizing health and environmental concern;
to establish responsible and generally accepted trade
practices;
to assist countries which have not established controls
designed to regulate the quality and suitability of
pesticide products needed in that country;
to ensure that pesticides are used effectively for the
improvement of agricultural production and of human, animal,
and plant health.
s Uram, note 3 supra, p. 477.
under its current scheme, for the reasons set forth in
Chapter III, will not solve the pesticide export problem.
The second international agreement is the Convention on
the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
Within Africa, adopted January 30, 1991 ("Bamako"). It is
the first international convention to directly regulate
international trade in banned and canceled pesticides.
Unfortunately, its membership is limited to member States of
the Organization of African Unity, and it is not yet in
force, as an insufficient number of parties have ratified
the convention. Bamako prohibits the export of hazardous
wastes. Bamako defines hazardous wastes to include
hazardous substances, including pesticides, which have been
banned, canceled or refused registration by government
regulatory action, or voluntarily withdrawn from
registration in the country of manufacture, for human or
environmental reasons.' Banned and canceled pesticides are
therefore per se hazardous wastes under Bamako.
While there is no legally binding international
agreement, pesticides use in North America, Latin America,
6 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and
the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous
Wastes Within Africa, adapted and opened for signature January 29,
1991, Organization of African Unity ("OAU") (hereafter "Bamako"),
article 2.1(d).
East Asia, and Africa continues to grow.7 At least 75% of
world pesticide production rests in the hands of 16
industrialized nations, according to a 1990/1991 survey
undertaken by the International Institute for Applied
Systems and the World Health Organization.' This study
also revealed that (among countries responding to the
survey) diverse situations exist with respect to national
legal frameworks, pre-market risk assessments, data (or the
lack thereof) on the quantities of pesticides produced,
used, exported, and disposed, and the extent of
international information exchange among these countries.'
Moreover:
the legal definition for pesticides are far from
internationally harmonized. They vary considerably in
complexity, precision, scope, and etymology. While most
countries regulate pesticides, others speak of 'plant
protection products'(!) or 'phytopharmaceutical
products'. 10
7 Pesticide Action Network, Global Pesticide Market Review,
PANNA, January 12, 1994, citing John McDougall and Matthew
Phillips, The World Agrochemical Market, Chemistry & Industry,
Pesticide News, November 15, 1993.
8 F. Schmidt-Bleek and M.M. Marchal, Comparing Regulatory
Regimes for Pesticide Control in 22 Countries: Towards a New
Generation of Pesticide Regulation, Regulatory Toxicology and
Pharmacology, Vol. 17, 1993, pp. 271-272. These sixteen (16)
countries include: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, The CSFR,
Cyrus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel,
Italy, Monaco, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden,
Switzerland, the former USSR, and the United States.
I Id.
10 Id. p. 273.
"On a global scale, a relatively small number of crops -
among them corn, rice, cotton, soybeans, and wheat (many
critical to late developing countries) - receive the bulk of
pesticides."" Currently, rice and cotton make up the
largest part of the world pesticide market." Growth in
North America is reflective of the fact that it is both a
large producer and exporter of agrochemicals, while Latin
America is a large consumer market, with Brazil being its
largest consumer. 3 In a 1993 report prepared by the World
Health Organization ("WHO"), entitled Pesticides in the
Americas," it was revealed that substantial segments of
the Latin American population have significant exposures to
pesticides. The population groups most directly affected
include: agricultural workers, women, minorities, and those
living in agricultural areas. Further, at least 1,000 -
2,000 pesticide poisonings occur annually in the smaller
Latin American countries, with proportionally larger numbers
" World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-95: A Guide
to the Global Environment, Oxford University Press, New York
(1994), p. 111-112. citing Gordon Conway and Jules Pretty,
Unwelcome Harvest: Agriculture and Pollution, Earthscan, London,
1991, p. 21, and James J. Tarrant, An Environmental Study of the
Proposed Indonesian National IPM Programme Study Project, FAO
Cooperative Programme, Jakarta, p. 12.
12 Id.
'3 Id.
'4 Samuel Henao et. al., Pesticide in the Americas, Pan
American Health Organization, WHO, February 1993.
in the larger, more populated countries."
At the upcoming May 1995 UNEP Governing Council meeting
in Nairobi, Kenya, it is anticipated that the delegates will
vote to start the process to change the currently voluntary
PIC procedures for chemicals and pesticides into a legally
binding convention." UNEP and FAO representatives have
stated that they would like to see negotiations on the new
convention completed by 1997." However, this thesis takes
the position that the pesticide problem cannot be
effectively addressed by transferring the FAO Code and PIC
system into a legally-binding international treaty, even
though they "appear to offer the greatest likelihood of
success in international regulation because they set
" Id. Other important findings of the report include: 1)
residues of organochlorine and organophosphorus are commonly found
in drainage, wells, and river water; and, 2) levels of
organochlorine compounds, especially DDT, are found at levels in
mother's milk which are higher than cow's milk, and are frequently
above the limits established by CODEX, especially among rural
women.
16 CL 107/REP/3 FAO Council 107th Session. UNEP/PIC/CONS.5/L,
Draft Report of the Work of the Meeting, UNEP/FAO Informal
Consultative Meeting to Consider Major Issues Related to the
Development of a Legally Binding Instrument for the Application of
the Treaty. See also: Cl 107/REP/3, FAO Council 107th Session,
November 1994. Final Report, International Conference on Chemical
Safety, IPCS/ICCS/94.8, April 29, 1994.
'" Sandra Marquardt and Cathy Fogel, Going Beyond PIC-- New
Convention May Include Export Ban, Global Production Bans and
Alternatives, in Global Pesticide Campaigner, Vol. 5, No. 1, March
1995.
international standards applicable to all nations."" More
specifically, neither begin to adequately address the human
health and environmental risks and damage which result from
exposure to pesticides in both industrialized or developed
countries ("DCs") and late developing countries ("LDCs").
A single, comprehensive, implementable, legally binding
international agreement is indeed needed to abate the
adverse human health and environmental consequences of
certain chemical pesticides, particularly the adverse
impacts in LDCs. However, the proposed agreement should
prohibit trade in banned and canceled pesticides and
establish an international pesticide regulatory system based
harmonization of regulations amongst the parties, which is
based on stringent reporting, data collection and
monitoring. Further, the convention should include
provisions to advance the transition to safe, alternative
pest management practices based on sustainable agricultural
programs. This will help to correct the reliance by certain
countries on chemical pesticides.
The convention must first and foremost expressly prohibit
the export of those banned, canceled, suspended, or
restricted use pesticides (and chemical ingredients in
pesticides which have been similarly banned, canceled or
18 Id., p. 476.
designated restricted use) which are prohibited from use in
the country of production to LDCs countries. 9 It is
argued that in many cases the adverse impacts of these
pesticides does not outweigh the benefits of their use, as
discussed in great detail in Chapter II. Because the list
of banned and canceled pesticides differs amongst different
countries, the actual list of these pesticides which are
prohibited from trade under the convention must be
negotiated by the parties, as discussed more fully in
Chapter VII.
As recommended by Baender in her 1991 article, "the heart
of the system should consist of a legally-binding,
multilateral agreement which would combat the problem of
scarce resources with a combination of bans and technology
transfers, [and] the convention [should be based] on the
precautionary principle,"20 which advocates the use of
19 Should such a convention occur, it is recommended that all
banned or canceled pesticides be prohibited from export between all
nations. The only possible exception would be for the limited use
of a pesticide for a specific purpose in accordance with stringent
training, use, monitoring and disposal criteria.
20 Margo Brett Baender, Pesticides and Precaution: The Bamako
Convention As A Model for An International Convention on Pesticides
Regulation, International Law and Politics, Vol. 24, 1991, p. 557.
Many international legal materials on the environment include
precautionary language. See, for example: 1) Climate Change: Final
Ministerial Declarations, Second World Climate Conference, Geneva,
November 7, 1990, paragraph 7, 2) Draft Ministerial Declaration,
Second World Climate Conference, Geneva, July 13, 1990, paragraph
17, 3) The ASEAN Workshop on Scientific,'Policy and Legal Aspects
of Global Climate Change, September 20, 1990, and 4) The IPCC
protective regulatory controls currently based on the
potential for harm, even in the face of some level of
scientific uncertainty as to the actual extent of potential
harm. Interestingly, there have been several comprehensive
recommendations for a major overhaul of the pesticide export
system, and for a "green convention on the international
trade and use of pesticides"." These recommendations have
fallen upon deaf ears in the international community until
recently. The possibility of such a convention was only
first seriously presented at the December 1994 UNEP/FAO
meeting in Geneva. Unfortunately, the May 1995 UNEP/FAO
meeting in Nairobi, Kenya is not expected to result in the
initiation of meaningful negotiations of a pesticide
convention. " [T~he limited scope and short timeline [for the
initiation of negotiations in May 19951 may not be
realistic."2 2 This is because:
it is likely than many delegates will push to expand
the convention to include prohibiting export of
pesticides, chemicals and possibly pharmaceuticals that
are banned domestically; banning global production and
trade of most dangerous chemicals; and promoting
Working Group III, Coastal Zone Management Workshop, Conference
Statement, p. 4 of conference report, February 23, 1990.
21 Id., p. 585.
22 Sandra Marquardt and Cathy Fogel, note 17 supra.
9
alternatives to toxic chemicals. Consequently,
negotiation of the convention is likely to take much
longer than planned, [although] it could ultimately
lead to a stronger, more comprehensive agreement.
A. Statement of the Problem
An international convention to prohibit the export of
banned and canceled pesticides, which regulates other
pesticide exports (including compliance with stringent
notification requirements), and which seeks to ensure the
implementation of alternative, safe pest management policies
and practices which incorporate principles of sustainable
agriculture (discussed more fully in Chapter VI) is probably
inevitable, inspite of the fact that past attempts were
unsuccessful, and that the upcoming UNEP/FAO negotiations
are not expected to conclude in a binding international
agreement, due to inadequate preparation.
The key producers of pesticides are few - mainly large
industrialized exporting nations. These include the United
States, the European Economic Community ("EEC") particularly
France, Germany, 2s Italy and the United Kingdom and Japan.
23 Id.
24 There have been numerous calls for an international
agreement regarding banned and canceled pesticides. See, for
example: Nancy D. Albers and Betsy D. Gelb, Hazardous Exports: An
Update and a Framework for Policy, Journal of Public Policy &
Marketing, Vol. 10, No.2., Fall 1991, p. 130-144.
25 The German chemical company, Hoechst, is the largest
manufacturer and exporter of endosulfan and triphenyltin, two
highly hazardous pesticides. Endosulfan pesticide poisoning
10
The United States has, in this author's view, the role of
principle organizer and principal negotiator in the
pesticide convention. The basis of this responsibility
centers on the fact that not only is the United States a key
pesticide exporter, but, it has power or "influence" in the
international community which it can use to create
incentives for other nations to participate. Further, it
has a pesticide regulatory system in place which includes
provisions for pesticide exports. There are currently
several proposals for revision of U.S. pesticide regulations
pertaining to residues in food and exports. Advocates
supporting these changes key objective is to change
pesticide regulations to incorporate more considerations of
adverse human health and environmental consequences into the
current cost-benefit analysis approach to pesticide
symptoms include headache, dizziness, disorientation, abdominal
cramps and fainting, convulsions and unconsciousness. Triphenyltin
acetate is a fungicide not registered for use in the United States
and banned in Japan and India. Its poison symptoms include
depression, tiredness, weakness, and dizziness. It has also been
linked to toxicity in aquatic environments. Hoechst has come under
fire in the Philippines for its challenge to government efforts to
ban these pesticides due to their extremely adverse human health
and environmental consequences. In retaliation, the company sued
several governmental agencies, among others. In 1994,
multinational NGOs, such as the Pesticide Action Network's Asia and
Pacific Regional Center (PAN A/P) launched a citizens' campaign
against Hoechst and other chemical manufacturers to demand that
governments around the world ban these two pesticides, with
particular emphasis on the situation in the Philippines. See:
Pesticide Action Network, International Citizens; Campaign Targets
Hoechst Pesticides, June 16, 1994, PANNA.
regulation.
B. Statement of the Purpose of This Thesis
The problem with pesticide exports is that those exported
are generally the most hazardous - those banned, cancelled,
or suspended in the country of export - and they are
typically exported to LDCs. Most of these LDCs lack the
requisite funding, training, regulatory mechanisms and
infrastructure to monitor imports and to enforce against
violations of import restrictions, if they exists.
Likewise, they lack the funding and capacity to train
farmers, agricultural workers, and others exposed to
pesticides in the safe handling, use, and disposal of these
chemicals. Incredibly, there is nothing to prohibit the
export of banned and canceled pesticides so long as certain
notification procedures are followed. Most DCs provide
little guidance or assistance in this regard. Further, the
United States notification system, and the PIC and other
United Nations pesticide programs are simply not effective,
as discussed in Chapter III.
As noted, world wide, pesticide exports to LDCs continue
to rise. This is in spite of the fact the potential for
harm to human health and the environment from pesticide
exposures and contamination outranks that of climate change,
biodiversity loss, ozone depletion, and most other
environmental "threats" for which international agreements
12
have been formulated in recent years. In many LDCs,
pesticide poisonings, injuries and deaths occur on a regular
basis.
The environmental degradation caused by pesticides is
also well documented. Why then is the problem of pesticides
not a top priority for international environmental
negotiation and action. This is a complex and controversial
question. Responses range from: 1) the North/South debate,
and the question of developing country sovereignty; 2) to
the position that the pesticide export question is more
appropriately a concern for bilateral or regional agreements
between or within exporting and importing nations; 3) to an
overall lack of concern for the problems of LDC farmers,
their families, or the perceived insignificance of the
markets for their produce.
There does, however, appear to be some very general
scientific consensus in international and national arenas
that certain pesticides or chemicals used to produce
pesticides are so dangerous that the benefits from their use
does not outweigh the potential for harm to human health and
the environment which accompanies such use. That these
pesticides and pesticide ingredients should be restricted or
banned from use is also not heavily debated. It then
follows that the negotiation of an international agreement
on pesticide exports should be an easy task (in comparison
13
to the scientific debates and uncertainties in the
biodiversity and climate change treaty negotiations, for
example) ." But what is the most logical and simple
solution to a problem does not hold true in international
negotiation on issues concerning the environment. These
negotiations are extremely complex and continue to evolve.
Negotiation of a pesticide convention is expected to
include contentious debates between, on the one hand, the
chemical industry, large pesticide exporting nations, and
certain LDCs who rely heavily on pesticides, and on the
other, those nations, non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"), and others who support a complete prohibition.
Indeed, "[c]oncern has [already] mounted within the chemical
industries of the U.S., Japan, and Europe, 27 that certain
pesticide exports will be severely restricted or banned
completely. Industry representatives argue that stricter
2' This thesis does not recommend the establishment of
scientific criteria and testing system to determine which
pesticides should be banned. Instead, it recommends that the
convention rely on cancellation or ban decisions made by the
country of origin. In the case where the same pesticide is banned
in one country and not in another, it is suggested that a
scientific committee review data submitted by each country
(including chemical ingredients) and issue a decision which applies
to the convention as a whole. This scientific committee should
also be authorized to allow the use of certain restricted use
pesticides, or banned pesticides in emergency situations where no
viable substitutes exist.
27 David Hunter, The EC Ponders Export Ethics, Chemical Week,
Vol. 141, No. 25, December 16, 1987, p. 12.
controls will not increase safety but will only create
serious trade barriers".28
It is this thesis' position that existing international
institutions and mechanisms which deal with pesticides are
simply ineffective at solving the human health and
environmental problems associated with pesticide exports.
However, there is important utility in several of these
institutions, such as the Food and Agricultural
Organizations's PIC system, and the Codex Committee on
Pesticide Residues, (a United Nations organization which
operates under the World Health Organization). Thus, any
proposal for the establishment of an international
convention on pesticides should review existing
institutions, and make modifications as necessary to meet
the objectives of such a convention.
The proposed ban cannot be effective immediately.
Phased, parallel, national and regionally specific programs,
to implement safe, effective, alternative pest management
practices are necessary. The design and implementation of
such programs is critical to the effectiveness of, and
compliance with the proposed convention. Not only must the
convention include express prohibitions with regard to
specific hazardous pesticides and chemicals used in the
28 Id.
production of pesticides (i.e., a global phase-out of both
production and trade of some of the most dangerous
chemicals), but it must include effective incentives to
prevent chemical producers from relocating their facilities
and technology to non-party nations and countries with less
stringent chemical regulations. Most important, the success
of the agreement requires: 1) technology transfers and
capacity building provisions (including financial transfers)
to allow the transition to safe alternative pest management
practices; 2) "right-to know" or "toxic release inventory"
provisions to ensure that the individual governments and
citizens have full information regarding chemicals; and 3)
provisions for sustainable agricultural programs and
policies.
This thesis provides several specific recommendations for
the international negotiations on the pesticide convention.
CHAPTER II - Justification for a Pesticide Convention: Human
Health and Environmental Consequences of Pesticide Use and
Abuse
I. Introduction
Pesticide abuse is but one of the many problems
associated with reliance [national and internationally]
on a 'chemicals only' approach to pest control.
Increasingly, scientists, policy-makers and others are
asking how much is enough to do the job, what constitutes
overkill, what pesticides do over time to human tissues,
and how they affect the environment.
What few realize is that most pesticides have not been
tested for safety, even if they are regulated. 30  This is
true in the United States as well as in most DCs.3 1 Thus,
most existing pesticide regulations are not based on
scientific studies conducted on the adverse human health and
29 Michael J. Dover, A Better Mousetrap: Improving Pest
Management for Agriculture, World Resources Institute, Study 4,
September 1985, p.v.
30 Jerome Pegg, Effect on Nontarget Organisms, Journal of
Pesticide Reform, Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 1992.
31 Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands are exceptions. These
countries are at the forefront in the creation of pesticide
reduction programs based on risk. See: Peter Hurst, Pesticide
Reduction Programs in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden,
International Environmental Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3, Summer 1992,
pp. 234-253; Peter Groenewegen and Wianne Brandt, Institutional
Barriers to Change: Agriculture, Pesticides and the Environment,
Paper for Greening of Industry Conference, 12-15 November 1994,
Copenhagen.
17
environmental consequences of their use and exposure."
For example, a 1982 House of Representatives staff report of
then registered pesticides found that 79-84 percent lacked
two required cancer studies, 60-70 percent lacked required
studies on birth defects and 90-93 percent lacked required
mutations studies. 3 Further, the generally available
scientific information regarding pesticides is old - it
pertains to the more well known adverse health impacts such
as acute and chronic toxicity, and certain carcinogenic and
teratogenetic impacts of pesticides.34 Less known is the
more recent scientific information concerning the estrogenic
impact of certain pesticides on human and animal
32 Alan Newman, Raising the Risk of Pesticides, Environmental
Science and Technology, Vol. 27, No. 9, 1993, pp. 1742-44; See
also: Congress of the United States, Office of Technology
Assessment, Neurotoxicity: Identifying and Controlling Poisons of
the Nervous System, April 1990, p. 287. This report notes that "in
1984, the National Academy of Science found that 67 percent of the
pesticides studied had undergone no neurotoxicity testing
whatsoever and all of the neurotoxicity tests performed were judged
to be inadequate.
3 Cybill Rutledge, Durban, Public Policy, and Alternatives,
January 1993, citing Tattersal, Ann, Is EPA Registration a
Guarantee of Pesticide Safety?, Journal of Pesticide Reform, Spring
1986, pp. 40-41.
34 Much has been written on these impacts of pesticides. For
a comprehensive discussion of the health impacts of chlordane and
cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticides, see: ATSDR, Case Studies in
Environmental Medicine: Chlordane Toxicity; Atlanta, GA; and ATSDR,
Case Studies in Environmental Medicine, Atlanta, GA.
reproductive systems, and their role in multiple chemical
sensitivity illnesses."
The adverse human health and environmental consequences
of pesticide uses and abuses suggest the need for a legally
binding international agreement on pesticides, particularly,
pesticide exports. The negative impacts of pesticide use
are well documented, particularly in certain LDCs, as fully
discussed in this chapter. It is not the purpose, nor is it
within the capacity of this thesis to challenge, or to
supplement, the current body of literature on this topic.
One the other hand, pesticides have played a significant
role in increasing agricultural production in the developing
world over the last several decades. Along with chemical
fertilizers, high-yield crop varieties, and intensive
3s Meggs, WJ. Neurogenic Inflammation and Sensitivity to
Environmental Chemicals, Environmental Health Perspectives, 101, p.
234-6, 1993; See also, Claudia S. Miller, White Paper: Chemical
Sensitivity: History and Phenomenology Toxicology and Industrial
Health, Vol. 10, No. 4/5, 1994, pp. 253-275; Nicholas A. Ashford
and Claudia S. Miller, Chemical Exposures: Low Levels and High
Stakes, Van Norstrand Reinhold, New York 1991 (They identify
roughly four types of people who have multiple chemical
sensitivity. One class includes those exposed to pesticides, and
other hazardous chemicals); William Rea, Chemical Sensitivity,
Lewis Publishers, Boca Raton, 1992; Bette Hileman, Multiple
Chemical Sensitivity, Chemical and Engineering News, July 22, 1991,
pp. 26-42; Mark Cullen et. al. The Experience of the Yale
Occupational and Environmental Medicines Clinics with Multiple
Chemical Sensitivity, 1986-1991, Yale University School of
Medicine; James E. Cone and Thomas A. Sult, Acquired Intolerance to
Solvents Following Acute Pesticide/ Solvent Intoxication in a
Building, draft 1.2, 9/9/91, in preparation for presentation at the
September 20-21, 1991 Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Workshop
sponsored by AOEC and ATSDR, Washington.
agricultural practices, pesticides have formed one of the
foundations of the so-called Green Revolution. Heavily
promoted by manufacturers, international aid agencies, and
the governments of developing nations, pesticides until
recently, were viewed as the quickest path to food self-
sufficiency and as a means to expand agricultural exports
needed to fund cash-poor economies. Developing world
policy-makers frequently consider pesticide use essential to
national development. At the same time,
[tihe perception has been that the developed world uses
developing countries as a dumping ground for dangerous
products and wastes. Proposals for more effective
control of such exports have included complete export
bans, enforced by exporting countries; more complete
information exchange programs; and [PIC], by which
importing governments would expressly consent to receipt
of regulated chemical products. The unmistakable
domestic and international trend is toward required
disclosure of even more health and environmental
information on export shipments or regulated products.37
To date, the need for pest control and the concern for
pesticide toxicity have not been reconciled. Banned and
canceled pesticides continue to be exported to LDCs at
alarming rates.
36 The World Resources Institute, World Resources: A Guide to
the Global Environment: 1994-1995, Oxford University Press, 1994,
p. 111.
3? Michael P. Walls, Disclosure Responsibilities for Exporters,
Natural Resources & Environment, Vol. 26, No. 6, Winter 1990, p.
10.
II. Human Health Impacts
Theo Colborn, a scientist with the World Wildlife Fund,
has proposed a controversial hypothesis linking
environmental exposure to certain persistent, toxic
chemicals to adverse reproductive and developmental effects
in wildlife via disruption of the endocrine system." It
is believed that due to the estrogenic properties of certain
pesticides, they are suspect in a number of human and
wildlife abnormalities including the demasculinization and
feminization of male species, metabolic disorders in birds,
fish and mammals, reduced fertility rates in wildlife and
humans, and cancer in humans." These adverse impacts are
most apparent in LDCs.4 In a March 1995 article entitled
" Theo Colborn, Ph.D. (1994) Position on Endocrine Disruptors,
World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C. Dr. Colborn develops several
lines of evidence to support her theory: 1) some persistent, toxic
chemicals (i.e., PCBs, PCDDs, PCDFs, Hg, PB, DDT) have been
measured at low levels in tissue or developmental effects in fish
and wildlife; 2) some experimental studies have noted that feeding
diets consisting of very high levels of these chemicals can cause
adverse effects in mammals, and 3) in experimental situations, some
of these chemicals, such as DDT, are capable of mimicking estrogen,
a natural hormone.
39 Sheldon Krimsky, The Genesis of an Environmental Risk Over
Estrogenic Chemicals: The Interplay Between Science, Ethics, and
Public Policy, Grant Proposal, Department of Urban & Environmental
Policy, Tufts University, February 1994.
40 See: Samuel Henao et. al. (1993) Pesticides and Health in
the Americas, Pan American Health Organization, Washington, D.C.
Pesticides Blamed for Infertility of Peasant Women, 4 it
was reported that:
[a]mong indigenous tribes in the Philippines, women are
the ones who keep the seeds, control pests and disease,
and take charge of harvesting, marketing and preparation
of farm produce for family consumption. Thus they spend
more time handling pesticides and wading in pesticide-
contaminated paddies and vegetable farms. [They are] more
vulnerable to pesticide poisoning than men because they
have more body fat where the chemicals lodge... Indigenous
women worry that the poison will be passed on to their
babies through their breast milk. Pregnant women,
toiling to add extra hands to the workforce, pass
pesticide residues to their fetuses which may result in
congenital disabilities. Young children, traditionally
blanket-tied to their mother's backs, are also exposed to
the pesticides as their mothers work in rice paddies."
There are over 200 independent studies that link 2 4-D
with various diseases, yet this chemical is an ingredient in
over 1500 over the counter weed killers.43 Further,
agricultural workers with at least one year of exposure to
pesticides are more likely to get cancer of the lung and
suffer unexplained premature death. And, there is a
dramatic increase in soft tissue sarcomas among pesticide
41 Pinky Serafica-Silva, Pesticides Blamed for Infertility of
Peasant Women, InterPress Services, March 16, 1995.
42 Id. See also: Judy Foreman, Scientists Probe Role of
Estrogen Mimics in the Environment, The Boston Globe, January 17,
1994, p.44; Rick Weiss, Estrogen in the Environment; Are Some
Pollutants A Threat to Fertility?, The Washington Post, January 25,
1994, p. Z10.
41 Jerome Pegg, note 30 supra.
factory workers."
Pesticides have been implicated in certain childhood
brain tumors and leukemia." Pesticides have also been
linked to cerebral disturbances in persons with multiple
chemical sensitivity,46 and because pesticides also mimic
natural estrogens, they have been associated with breast
cancer4 7 and testicular cancer.4" They can impact immune
systems, behavior and metabolism." Commonly used
agricultural and lawn pesticides contain products that are
" Id.
4' National Research Council, Pesticides in the Diets of
Infants and Children, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
1993; Environmental Working Group, Pesticides in Children's Food,
Washington, D.C. 1993.
46 Cindy Duehring, Cerebral Disturbances in MCS Patients: A
Double-Blind Pesticide Exposure Study, in Our Toxic Times, Vol. 4,
No. 12, February 1995.
4? Gayle Green and Vicki Ratner, The Chemicals Around Us: A
Toxic Link to Breast Cancer?, The Nation Magazine, June 20, 1994;
Mary Wolff et. al, Residues of DDT Metabolite Linked to Increased
Risk of Breast Cancer Journal of the National Cancer Institute,
Vol. 85, No. 8, April 21, 1993.
48 Jerome Pegg, note 30 supra.
49 See: House of Representatives, Health Effects of Estrogenic
Pesticides, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 103-87,
October 21, 1993; National Wildlife Foundation, Fertility on the
Brink: The Legacy of the Chemical Age, WWF, Washington, D.C. 1994.
See generally: Nicholas Ashford and Claudia Miller, Chemical
Exposures: Low Levels and High Stakes, Van Norstrand Reinhold, New
York (1991); National Research Council, The Capacity of Toxic
Agents to Compromise the Immune System (Biologic Markers of
Immunosuppression), in Biomarkers in Immunotoxicity, National
Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1992, pp. 63-83.
known to cause cancer of the kidneys, testicles, stomach,
colon, prostate and liver. Exposure to certain pesticides
also results in eye, skin, respiratory, cardiovascular,
gastrointestinal, neurological, and hematologic effects,5 0
and disorders of the liver, reproductive and developmental
disorders, low sperm counts, increased birth defects,
physiological effects, gastrointestinal ulcers, and altered
lipid metabolism are known to occur in people who use
pesticides."'
A pesticide's potential for causing chronic health
effects depends on its inherent harmfulness (chronic
toxicity) and the extent to which people come in contact
with its (exposure).52 "By design, pesticides are
biologically active and in most cases, toxic. How real and
substantial those risks are depends on (1) what happens if
the chemical reaches organs, tissues, or cells; (2) how much
of the chemical is required to show such effects; and (3'
how likely the chemical is to reach these sites in
50 See: Agnes C. Rola and Prabhu L. Pingali, Pesticides, Rice
Productivity, and Farmers' Health: An Economic Assessment,
International Rice Research Institute, World Resources Institute,
1993, pp. 55-63.
si Jerome Pegg, note 30 supra.
52 GAO, Nonagricultural Pesticides: Risks and Regulation,
GAO/RCED-86-97 (April 1986), p.3; See also: Janette D. Sherman,
Chemical Exposure and Disease: Diagnostic and Investigative
Techniques, Princeton Scientific Publishing Company, Inc.,
Princeton, 1994.
sufficient quantities to produce the effects." 53 The
environmental consequences of a pesticide's use is measured
by its impact on the target pest (extermination).
Unfortunately, little is known about the extent and impact
of pesticide use on non-target species.4 (The problem of a
pesticide's impact on non-target species is discussed
below.) Sensitivity to toxicants varies greatly from
species to species, even within the same genus,55 and the
"degree of hazard presented by a pesticide depends on many
complex factors. Although no single way of expressing a
potential hazard is completely reliable, the most rapid and
convenient indicator of hazard for most chemicals is acute
toxicity (the single dosage necessary to produce death)"."
Not much more is known about the long term impacts of the
use of certain pesticides on humans.
Stated differently, the potential health hazard of a
pesticide depends on five factors: 1) the inherent toxicity
s3 Michael J. Dover, note 29 supra, p.2, citing Douglas G.
Baugher, Exposure to Pesticides During Application: A Critical
Review of the State of the Art, consultant report to World
Resources Institute, October 1984.
s David Pimental, Ecological Effects of Pesticides on Non-
Target Species, Executive Office of the President, Office of
Science and Technology, June 1971, p. 177.
s Richard K. Tucker, Handbook of Toxicity of Pesticides to
Wildlife, U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife
Service, March 1970, p. 1.
56 Id., p. 2.
of the active ingredient; 2) the chemical and physical
properties of the active ingredient; 3) the duration of
exposure; 4) the dose and/or concentration; and, 5) the
route of absorption.57 The possible classical effects of
pesticide exposure can be divided into three categories: 1)
acute exposure, or immediate identifiable response, such as
poisoning or topical injuries; 2) chronic low exposure, such
as occurs from exposure to pesticide residues in food, which
may cause long-delayed health effects; and 3) chronic high
exposure, the long term effects of more intense exposure to
pesticides, which often occurs occupationally. 8 In the
case of synthetic organic pesticides, there is little
consistent data on how synthetic organic pesticides
materials affect people.59
In the case of humans, the problem of limited research is
based in part on the utilization of a cost-benefit analysis
approach to pesticide regulations which does not fully
consider all documented adverse human health or
environmental consequences from their use. Pesticide
s Policy Research Project on Pesticide Regulation in Texas,
Pesticide and Worker Health in Texas, University of Texas at
Austin, 1984, p.4, citing, J. Davies, U.S. EPA, Office of Pesticide
Programs, Pesticide Protection: A Training Manual for Health
Personnel, March 1977.
58 Id., p.11.
s9 Michael J. Dover, note 29 supra, p. 2.
regulation in the United States, for example, was and is
based on cost-benefit analysis - EPA balances the known
risks pesticides pose to human health and environment
against their benefit." Many advocates of pesticide
regulatory change in the United States support regulatory
decisions regarding pesticides which place greater focus on
the potential risks they pose to human health and the
environment as part their cost/benefit analysis." To
illustrate the fact that the adverse health and
environmental consequences are not fully explored prior to
pesticide regulatory decision in the United States, note
that if a pesticide lacks registration it indicates either
that: a) it has not been evaluated by EPA to determine that
it will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on human
health or the environment when used according to approved
label directions; or b) its registration has been disallowed
due to the discovery of evidence of such hazard, after a
regulatory decision allowing its use." Pesticides fitting
into the latter category, along with those banned and
canceled, account for a high percentage of exports to LDCs,
60 GAO, Pesticides: Better Data Can Improve the Usefulness of
EPA's Benefit Assessments, GAO/RCED-92-32 (December 1991), p. 2.
61 Id., p.1.
62 Carl Smith and Shelly Beckman, Ph.D., Unregistered Pesticide
Exports in 1990, FASE, 1992.
and are responsible for the high rate of human health
problems associated with pesticides. "The British Journal
of Industrial Medicine has estimated that developing
countries account for 20% of world use of agricultural
chemicals and 99% of all deaths from pesticide
poisoning. "
Further:
EPA Studies in Central Luzon, North of Manila in the
Philippines, showed major rises in pesticide purchases in
the early 1970s, accompanied by a 27 per cent rise in the
death rates of men of working age. Deaths up until 1976
peaked in August, the height of the spraying season. In
that year double-cropping began on the local irrigation
scheme, and spraying in February was matched by a second
peak in deaths in that month. Protective clothing was
not worn, and the backpack sprayers used put 40 mg of
active ingredients of pesticide onto operators per
hour. "
In a 1991 report, the Foundation for Advancements in
Science and Education ("FASE") found that the exports of
compounds known or suspected to cause cancer, genetic
mutations, or adverse prenatal or reproductive effects was
high, accounting for 24% of all pesticides exported from the
U.S. in 1991, and a staggering 95% of all 1991 pesticide
6 Id.
" W.M. Adams, Green Development: Environment and
Sustainability in the Third World, Routledge, 1990, reprinted 1993,
citing Pearce F. Pesticide Deaths: The Price of the Green
Revolution, New Scientist, June 18, 1987, p. 30.
exports that could be specifically identified.65 A 1989
WHO study identified a group of 15 pesticides with priority
for epidemiological studies, due to their potential for
"severe effects on human health or the environment.""
Customs documents contain records of nine of these compounds
being exported from U.S. ports in 1991, totaling more than
13 million pounds.67
Most LDCs lack the scientific, institutional, and
financial capacity to regulate the use of chemicals." At
the same time: "[mlany [LDCs], dependent upon agriculture
for both domestic consumption and export income, find
themselves at the mercy of agricultural pests. In addition,
malaria and other pest-borne diseases are among the major
65 Carl Smith, U.S. Pesticide Traffic - Exporting Banned and
Hazardous Pesticides, The Global Pesticide Campaigner, August 1993,
citing Hallenbeck, W.H., Cunningham-Burns, K.M. Pesticides and
Human Health, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985.
66 Id., citing, World Health Organization, Public Health Impact
of Pesticides Used in Agriculture. Report of WHO/UNEP Working
Group, 1989; See also: Anthony DeCrosta, The Two Faces of Pesticide
Exports, Organic Gardening, Vol. 11, No. 2., October 1990, p. 79-
80.
'7 Id.
68 Jack Early and Edith D. Meacham, Is It Safe TO Sell Banned
Pesticides Overseas? Two Views, EPA Journal, January/February 1985,
Vol. 15, No. 9, p. 12-13.
29
causes of death in many LDCs." 69 Often, to the extent that
a pesticide regulatory framework exists in these countries,
it is insufficient in ensuring adequate protection of human
health and the environment from pesticide toxicity." And,
proper precautions in use, application, and storage are
seldom taken, resulting in pesticide poisonings and deaths,
resistant pests, and resurgent secondary pests.7" This can
result in what Karen Goldberg describes as the "treadmill
effect" wherein "devastating economic problems can result
from the overuse of pesticides on cash crops when the
evolution of chemical-resistant insect strains leads to
declining yields and requires the use of increasingly toxic
pesticides.72
It has been estimated that the incident of human
'9 Karen Goldberg, Efforts to Prevent Misuse of Pesticides
Exported to Developing Countries: Progressing Beyond Regulation and
Notification, Ecology Law Review, Vol. 12, 1985, p. 1025; See
also: Abdul Aziz et. al., Pest Management and the Environment in
2000, 1992.
7 For a comparison of the pesticide regulatory framework in
certain countries, including certain LDCs, See: F. Schmidt-Bleek
and M.M. Marchal, Comparing Regulatory Regimes for Pesticide
Control in 22 Countries: Towards a New Generation of Pesticide
Regulation, Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology, Vol. 17, pp.
262-281 (1993); J. Conner, Foreign and International Regulation of
Pesticides; U.S. Regulation of Exports and Imports, Chapter X,
Executive Enterprise Report, 1983, p. 333.
?1 Id.
72 Goldberg, note 69, supra, p. 1025.
30
pesticide poisonings, including acute poisonings, in LDCs is
as much as thirteen times higher than in the United
States.7 3 In Guatemala, reports indicated that the average
DDT levels in cows' milk were, at points, ninety times that
allowed in the United States. Other reports showed that
Nicaraguans and Guatemalans had thirty-one times more DDT in
their blood than Americans, where DDT has been banned since
1970.74 "There are many indicators that the extent of
occupational pesticides poisoning is seriously
underestimated, including a study of mortality rates in a
major rice-growing area of the Philippines. Many LDCs
discourage workers from reporting illnesses, and others have
intentionally set up systems to under report the actual
rates of pesticide deaths and sickness. Additionally,
improper use and disposal of toxic pesticides can enter the
eco-system resulting in massive fish kills, bio-
accumulation, and proliferation of adverse effects
throughout the food chain. Further, these banned pesticides
threaten not only foreign farmers who spray the chemicals,
73 Id., p. 1026.
7 Raymond Hill, Problems and Policies for Pesticide Exports
to Less Developed Countries, Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 19,
No. 5., Fall 1988, p. 702; citing D. Weir and M. Shapiro, Pesticide
Pollution Goes International, 37 Business & Society Rev., 47, 49
(Spring 1980-81).
7s Id.
but they threaten foreign consumers who eat contaminated
foods, including American shoppers who purchase bananas,
coffee, strawberries, tapioca, cut flowers and other
imported commodities with potentially unsafe residues.7
This is known as the "boomerang effect".77
III. Environmental Consequences
Pesticides are a nearly ubiquitous pollutant. By design,
they are biocides, compounds intended to be lethal to
their targets. Unfortunately, only a handful restrict
their toxic effects to the target pest. Most make their
presence felt across a broad spectrum, doing widespread
incidental damage to diverse wildlife, plant life, and
soil and water organisms.78
And,
Once released into the environment, DDT and most
chlorinated hydrocarbons can take years to break down
into simpler, less toxic chemicals. And because they are
more soluble in fat than in water, these pesticides tend
to accumulate in living organisms... Chemicals less
persistent than chlorinated hydrocarbons also have their
deleterious effects. Organophosphate and carbamate
insecticides, for instance, are more water-soluble and
thus more likely to reach aquatic and marine organisms -
unintended victims of the original pesticide application.
Many of these materials are also more acutely toxic,
posing a greater hazard to farm workers in particular.
76 Carl Smith, note 65 supra.
77 Id.
78 World Resources Institute, World Resources: A Guide to
Global Environment, 1994-1995, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.
113.
Moreover, some persist in the environment much longer
than originally thought, making long-term effects on
'non-target populations' a serious possibility."
Pesticides contaminate groundwater, agricultural run-off
takes pesticides from the land to water, which in turn
pollutes surface water, poison fish," wildlife, domestic
animals,8 1 and drinking water supplies.82 Furthermore,
recent scientific studies implicate the highly toxic
hazardous chemical methyl bromide, used widely in
pesticides, with depletion of the ozone layer. 83 Its
estimated lifetime is two years, and it is believed to be
79 Michael J. Dover, note 29, p.2, citing Douglas G. Baugher,
Exposure to Pesticides During Application: A Critical Review of the
State of the Art, consultant report to World Resources Institute,
October 1984, p. 4-5, citing, in part, Robert F. Wasserstrom and
Richard Wiles, Field Duty: U.S. Farmworkers and Pesticide Safety,
World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C. 1985.
8 For a discussion of methods to reduce pesticide run-off to
fisheries, see: Charles Benbrook, Best Management Practices for
Reducing Pesticide Run-off and Toxicity in the Coastal Fisheries of
Ecuador: A Preliminary Assessment, Appropriate Technology Limited,
Dallas, Texas, March 30, 1994.
81 Baender, note 20 supra, p. 562.
82 Richard Wiles et. al. Tap Water Blues: Herbicides in
Drinking Water, Environmental Working Group Physicians for Social
Responsibility, 1994.
83 Chip Clark et. al. (1994) The Phase Out of Methyl Bromide
in Developing Countries; Anne Schonfield et. al. (1994) Methyl
Bromide Use and Alternatives in Africa, Parts I and II.
responsible for 5 to 10 % of stratospheric ozone
depletion." Its adverse human health effects are more
disturbing. Methyl bromide is extremely toxic to humans,
especially if inhaled. It is odorless, colorless, and
tasteless, and can result in respiratory problems,
neurological disorders and possible death. Yet, it is used
in many LDCs for soil, commodity(for exports) and structural
fumigation. This is a practice driven by DCs, like the
United States, Japan, and the EC.
The long-term adverse environmental consequences of
pesticide uses, although heavily documented, are not fully
known. For example, one study found that:
DDT accumulated in the soil over [a] four-year
experimental period... Soil organisms showed shifts in
numbers and species complement, and there were both
qualitative and quantitative changes in the pathways
and rates of litter breakdown. Although yields were
higher in the short-term under pesticide use,
contamination in soils following pesticide use reduced
yields... DDT may impair the system's capacity to
regenerate fertility in fallow periods.85
The use of many other pesticides has led to the
84 Id.
85 W.M. Adams, note 64 supra, p.117-119.
development of pesticide resistance in some organisms."
"Prolonged exposure of a species to one and the same
compounds has led to the establishment of resistant
populations, especially cyclodiences. [And], minor pests
became major pests owing to the elimination of their natural
predators as a result of intense pesticide application.
In Arizona, for example, Ware" pointed out that until 1972
to 1974, spider mites, cotton leaf-perforator, and tobacco
budworm were classed as minor pests. But, with the
destruction of their predators following intense use of
organophosphorus compounds (OP compounds), they became major
pests. Similarly, at the time of introduction of
organochlorine compounds (OC compounds) in Central America
in 1950, there were only two cotton pests of economic
importance. By 1955, subsequent to the use of DDT, HCH, and
86 See generally: National Research Council, Pesticide
Resistance: Strategies and Tactics for Management, National Academy
Press, Washington D.C. 1986; David Pimental and Nancy Goodman,
Environmental Impact of Pesticides, Survival in Toxic Environments,
M.A.Q. Khan and John B. Bederka, Jr., (eds.) Academic Press, New
York, 1974, p. 25-52.
87 A.S. Murty, Toxicity of Pesticides to Fish, Vol. I, CRC
Press, 1986, p. 2. Citing Odum, E.P. and Sumerford, W.T.,
Comparative Toxicity of DDT and Four Analogues to Goldfish,
Gumbusia and Culex Larae, Science, 104, 480, 1946; Standard
Practice for Conducting Acute Toxicity Tests with Fishes,
Macroinvertebrates, and Amphibians, American Society for Testing
and Materials, Philadelphia, 1980, p.1.
" Id., citing Ware, OECD Guidelines for Testing Chemicals,
OECD 1981 Draft, Paris, 1981, p. 1 .
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toxaphene, three more species emerged as major problems. By
the mid-1960s, attempts to control the five species led to
an increase in the number of pests of economic importance
(ten species); pesticide use thus had the exact opposite
effect to the desired one, i.e., instead of controlling
pests, it brought new pests into being."
The use of organophosphorus and carbamate insecticides in
agriculture is implicated in some instances in the
development of pesticide resistance in mosquito vectors of
malaria. 9' For example, in Malaysia, the number of rice
pests resistant to at least one pesticide rose from eight in
1965 to fourteen in 1975.91
As noted, one of the most significant adverse
environmental impacts of pesticide usage is their
detrimental impact on non-target species. Pimental points
out that "while the direct effects of pesticides are
relatively easily observed, the indirect effects are far
89 Id.
90 PEEM, Effects of Agricultural Development and Change in
Agricultural practices on the Transmission of Vector-Borne
Diseases, pp. 8-51, in the Report of the 7th Meeting of the Joint
WHO/FAO/UNEP Panel of Experts on Environmental Management for
Vector Control (PEEM), 1987, cited in W.M. Adams, note 62 supra, p.
118.
91 Id., p. 118.
more complicated". 2 And, "it is difficult to discern
whether the numbers of a species are declining and if they
are, whether the decline is because of a pesticide or
because of the numerous other environmental factors which
impinge upon natural populations"."
Pimental's list of several of the negative impacts and
problems of pesticide use on non-target species include:
1) habitat alternation and species reduction;
2) behavioral changes;
3) growth of animals and plants - stimulation of
growth in non-target species;
4) reproduction problems;
92 Pimental, note 54 supra, p. 177.
93 Id. Pimental states "that one of the problems involved in
determining the impact of pesticides on non-target species was the
investigation of why some predatory bird species declined in
habitats where chlorinated insecticide residues were abundant. Some
wildlife biologists suspected DDT residues were having an adverse
effect, but the influence of urbanization was recognized as an
additional factor contributing to bird mortality. When studying
natural populations, it is nearly impossible to single out each
factor and gauge just how it contributes to the total mortality".,
p. 178.
5) food quality changes;
6) pesticide resistance in animals and plants;
7) disease susceptibility;
8) biological concentration (bioaccumulation in
plant and animal tissue);
9) persistence;
10) pesticide movement and residues in the
environment; and,
11) wildlife management problems.94
94 Id., p. 178-181. Pimental makes the following
generalizations about the effect of insecticides, herbicides, and
fungicides on populations and communities of natural species: 1)
Pesticides tend to reduce significantly the numbers of individuals
of some species in biotic communities, which has the similar
ecological effect of reducing the number of species. 2) An
important reduction in the number of species in a community may
lead to instability within that community and subsequently to
population outbreaks because of alteration in the normal check-
balance structure of the community. 3) After pesticide
applications the species populations most likely to increase in
numbers are those in the lower part of the food chain, that is, the
plant feeders. This is, in part, because the parasitic and
predaceous enemies which naturally help control numbers of plant
feeders are more susceptible to pesticide pollution effects. 4)
Any effective loss of species or intense fluctuations in number of
species low in the food chain may adversely affect the dependent
predator and parasitic species at the top of the food chain. This
A. S. Murty, an environmental toxicologist interested in
the toxicity of xenobiotic chemicals to non-target
organisms, has conducted extensive research into the
question of the impact of pesticides in aquatic
environments." Two sources of aquatic pesticide
contamination are recognized: 1) point sources; and 2) non-
point sources. " Non-point sources include: 1)
agricultural lands, including mobility of pesticide residues
in the soil, absorption, and runoff losses; 2) urbanized
sources; 3) sewage; and 4) used pesticide containers.
in turn further disrupts the structure and ultimately the stability
of the natural community. p. 182.
95 A.S. Mutry, note 87 supra.
96 Id., p.11.
97 Id., p. 16. Other studies on the impact of pesticides on
aquatic environments include: Gould, Robert F, ed. Fate of Organic.
Pesticides in the Aquatic Environment, Advances in Chemistry
Series, No. 111, Washington, D.C., American Chemical Society, 1972;
DeSilva, Edgar J., et. al., Effect of Pesticide on Blue-Green Algae
and Nitrogen-Fixation, Archives of Environmental Contaminations and
Toxicology 3 (1975) p. 193-204; Hulbert, Stuart H., Secondary
effects of Pesticides on Aquatic Eco-systems, Residue Reviews 57
(1975), p. 82-148; Muirhead-Thompson, R.C., Pesticides and
Freshwater Fauna, London and New York, Academic Press, 1971 vii,
248; Paris, Doris F., and Lewis, David L., Chemicals and Microbial
Degradation of Ten Pesticides in Aquatic Systems, Residue Reviews
45 (1973), p. 93-124; Phillips, John H., Effect of Pesticide
Chemicals on Marine Organisms, Agricultural Chemicals--Harmony or
Discord for Food, People and the Environment, J.E. Swift, ed.,
1971, p. 63-79; Rudd, Robert L. and Herman, Steven G., Ecosystemic
Transferal of Pesticide Residues in an Aquatic Environment,
Environmental Toxicology of Pesticides, Fumio Matsumura, et. al.
(eds.) New York, Academic Press, 1972, p. 471-485; Aulerich, R.J.,
et. al. Effects of Feeding Coho Salmon and Other Great Lakes Fish
on Mink Reproduction, Canadian Journal of Zoology, 49 (1971) p.
Point sources generally include: 1) sheep dips; 2) effluents
from pesticide formulating plants; and, 3) accidental
spillage."
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations for Proposed
Convention
The evidence of adverse impacts of pesticides to human
health and the environment is increasing. Thus, it is
imperative that the objective of the pesticide convention be
clearly stated at the outset - to prohibit the export of
banned, canceled, and suspended pesticides and pesticide
chemicals between and among DCs and LDCs (a short term
goal); to create a pesticide regulatory system based on
human health and environmental considerations, which
includes a detailed notification and monitoring scheme for
chemical pesticide whose use continues; and; to design and
implement alternative, safe pest management practices and
611-616; Crockett, A.B., et. al. Pesticide and Mercury Residues in
Commercially Grown Catfish, Pesticides Monitorinq Journal, 8
(1975), p. 235-40.
98 Id.
policies which incorporate existing and evolving principles
of sustainable agriculture in the long term (See: Chapter
VI).
CHAPTER III - The Role of Existing Institutions in the
Formulation of a Framework Convention on Pesticides
I. International and Intergovernmental Organizations
International organizations, also referred to as
international governmental organizations ("IGOs") , are
formed by member states either for multiple purposes (as in
the case of the United Nations or various regional
associations) or for more specialized purposes (as in the
case of the specialized agencies of the United Nations) ."
It is this thesis' position that certain existing
international institutions and mechanisms which deal with
pesticides are simply ineffective at solving the human
health and environmental problems associated with pesticide
exports. However, there is important near-term and long-
term utility in some. The United Nations Environment
Programme's ("UNEP") Food and Agricultural Organization
("FAO") (including the PIC system), and the Codex Committee
on Pesticide Residues (a United Nations organization which
99 Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental
Politics, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991, p. 46.
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operates under the World Health Organization, for example,
may provide important short and long term assistance in the
negotiation, design and implementation of programs under the
proposed convention. IGOs involved with pesticides can be
categorized into three groups: 1) those which seek to
address pesticide problems currently (i.e. UNEP, FAO, WHO,
and the OECD); 2) those with marginal current activity, but
which have the potential to assist more fully in the
development and implementation of alternative pest
management programs and policies (i.e. the WB and the Global
Environment Facility); and, 3) those with no measurable
activity, but which should be reviewed for potential
assistance (i.e. the International Labour Organization).
Many of these institutions will play significant roles in
the negotiation of the pesticide convention.
Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown point out in their
book Global Environmental Politics 100 that IGOs can
influence the outcome of environmental negotiations in the
following five (5) ways:
1) They may influence the agenda for global
action, determining which issues will be dealt
with by the international community as highest
priorities.
100 Id., p.47.
2) They may influence how negotiations are
conducted by sponsoring them and directly
intervening in the process.
3) They may develop normative codes of conduct
(soft law) on various environmental issues that
lack the force of binding agreements but that
nevertheless influence international behavior.
4) They may seek to influence its member states'
environmental policies directly and become a
party to global environmental development or
environmental programs that directly affect the
willingness and ability of developing states to
conserve their resources and the global
environment.
5) They may sponsor, coordinate, or finance
economic development or environmental programs
that directly affect the willingness and
ability of developing states to conserve their
resources and the global environment.'
Key IGOS Active in the Pesticide Area
1. UNEP
The most influential IGO is the UNEP which has agenda
setting functions.10 2 UNEP has "regularly identified
environmental threats which required international
cooperation", and "has also been the primary [IGO] in
101 Id., p. 47.
102 Id., p. 48.
initiating and managing global negotiations"," 3 including
the international negotiations on ozone and the conventions
on preserving biological diversity and climate change."
UNEP's agenda setting function is carried out by its
fifty-eight member Governing Council, elected by the
General Assembly for three-year terms. The developing
countries hold a majority (thirty-nine) of the seats on
the Council, but the United States, which has been the
single largest contributor to the organization, has
also been the stringent influence on decisions of both
the Secretariat and the Council (emphasis added). Many
of the key UNEP decisions, such as the 1976 in
identifying ozone depletion as a priority area, were
pushed primarily by Washington."
Oran R. Young notes that " [i]nternational organizations
(together with non-governmental organizations in many
instances) frequently play a catalytic role in environmental
issues, influencing the way the issues are conceptualized or
framed and acting to propel them toward the top of the
international policy agenda".1 6 "More and more,
'03 Id., p. 48-49. Most of the major international
environmental conventions of the 1970s and 1980s were the result of
negotiations sponsored by UNEP. Such agreements include: The
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1973); The
Convention on the Preservation of Maritime Pollution by Dumping
(1972); The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
(1985); The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (1987); The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes (1989).
" Id.
'os Id.
106 Oran R. Young, Perspectives on International Organizations,
in International Environmental Negotiation, Gunnar Sjostedt (ed.),.
Sage Publications, Newbury Park, London, 1993, p. 249.
international organizations have become a source of
leadership in environmental negotiations, a development that
makes it appropriate to refer to them as the architects of
the institutional arrangements emerging from these
negotiations. "117 Further:
[a] variety of international organizations can and do
become actively involved in environmental negotiations.
Multipurpose organizations, like the [Economic
Commission for Europe] ("ECE") and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") , assume
leading roles in some environmental negotiations;
organizations whose mandate is limited to environmental
issues, like the UNEP, take on these roles in other
cases. Even among environmental organizations, there
is an important distinction between those focused on a
single issue and those whose concerns extend to a broad
spectrum of environmental issues. Whereas the
[International Commission for the Protection of the
Rhine Against Pollution] ("ICPR") has played a key role
in devising the terms of the Rhine River regime, for
example, UNEP has emerged as an important player in
developing regimes to control regional pollution,
protect the ozone layer, regulate transboundary
shipments of hazardous wastes, and most recently, deal
with climate change."
The UNEP has an important monitoring, coordinating and
catalytic role in the promotion and implementation of the
United Nation's environmental projects and therefore has an
important role in the negotiation of a binding agreement on
107 Id., p. 250.
108 Id., p. 246.
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pesticides. 9
2. Food and Agricultural Organization
Rather than creating a new body to oversee the proposed
convention's implementation, the UNEP's FAO can act as a
monitoring, implementation, and enforcement agency."' In
1990, UNEP incorporated the PIC provisions covering
chemicals into the London Guidelines for the Exchange of
Information on Chemicals in International Trade (London
Guidelines), and the International Register of Potentially
Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) gives an excellent background for
monitoring a convention on trade in pesticides."'
Currently, there are over 300 chemicals and pesticides on
the list of substances banned or severely restricted for
human health or environmental concerns in one or more
countries. Only 12 pesticides and 5 industrial chemicals
have officially entered the PIC procedure.
PIC is an international procedure that requires that
importing governments be informed of the hazards of specific
pesticide products and give explicit consent for their
import before the pesticides are shipped. PIC is jointly
109 See generally: Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.)
The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests
and Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.
" Baender, note 20 supra, p. 604.
" Id.
operated by the FAO Plant Protection Divisions and the UNEP
through its International Register of Potentially Toxic
Chemicals ("IRPTC") in Geneva. The FAO is the lead agency
for operating the PIC scheme for pesticides. The joint
FAO/UNEP panel of experts, which includes nongovernmental
organization ("NGO") observers, was established to develop
and guide the process, and now meets about every nine
months.
The United Nations and the FAO have both made
considerable efforts to solve the problem of hazardous
exports, including the export problem." 2 For example, in
1983, the U.N. General Assembly overwhelmingly passed
Resolution 37/137 which called for stringent restrictions on
the export of banned or severely restricted products and for
the development of an easily understandable list of these
products."3 The United States was the only nation to
oppose this resolution."4
The FAO is already investigating the utility of certain
integrated pest management ("IPM") programs currently being
112 Early and Meacham, note 68 supra, p. 13.
"3 Id.
"4 Id.
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implemented in several developing countries." 5 As part of
its monitoring responsibility under the pesticide
convention, FAO should investigate and determine the extent
of stockpiled obsolete pesticides in LDCs which are
hazardous wastes which should be properly disposed of. Many
stockpiled pesticides in LDCs is stored in containers with
no integrity - they are often open or corroded - thus their
contents contaminate soil and water supplies, among many
other adverse effects. FAO should also help LDCs to phase-
out the use of banned and canceled pesticides, and implement
alternative, safe pest management practices which
incorporate principles of sustainable agriculture. Funding
to support these activities could be established through
financial mechanisms designed under the convention,
discussed more fully below.
In 1963, the FAO also established the FAO Guidelines for
Legislation Concerning the Registration for Sale and
Marketing of Pesticides. The Committee's Working Party of
Experts on Official Control of Pesticides, was directed to
develop advice concerning registration and approval schemes
n1s FAO IPM Meeting in Bangkok: Global Study Tour and Meeting
Showcase Asian IPM Successes; Governments and Donors Endorse '1PM
Manifesto', Pesticide Action Network, November 17, 1993.
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for official control of pesticides."6
3. The World Health Organization ("WHO")
The WHO, founded on April 7, 1948, is an
intergovernmental organization. All member states of the
United Nations may become members of WHO by accepting its
Constitution. It seeks to protect and promote human health
through national, community, family, and personal measures
for the prevention and control of conditions and factors in
the environment that adversely affect human health; to
116 U.S. EPA, Law and Institutional Mechanisms Controlling the
Release of Pesticides into the Environment, Office of Water
Programs, Pesticide Study Series 11, p.80, citing FAO Guidelines
for Legislation Concerning the Registration for Sale and Market of
Pesticides. The Guidelines provide that: 1) the Registrar may,
after considering the evidence submitted in support of an
application for registration, decide instead to issue a provisional
permit. A provisional permit would entail use of the pesticide for
a shorter period of time than the registration period, and under
stipulated conditions, for the purpose of obtaining information
needed before granting a registration. The stipulated conditions
may include safety and health precautions, periods of use, methods
of application, and other matters. 2) Administrative regulations
under legislation based on the Guidelines may contain special
provisions with respect to pesticide substances or operations
considered to present a high degree of hazard to human health or
the environment. Such regulations may specifically include:
restrictions of the sale of such substances to insure their use by
authorized organizations or persons only, conditions for field
evaluation of experimental compounds, and provisions necessary to
safeguard third parties, the environment and wildlife. 3) The
Registrar has authority to regulate pesticides packaging and
labeling. 4) The label must contain instructions for safe disposal
of used containers. 5) The sale or distribution of a pesticide is
unlawful if the pesticide has decomposed or deteriorated so as to
be ineffective or dangerous, or if it is packaged in containers
which have deteriorated or have been damaged so as to be
potentially dangerous in storage or use. 6) False or misleading
advertising of any pesticide, or advertising that is not justified
by the conditions of registration, is unlawful.
coordinate environmental health matters on behalf of WHO's
constituencies; and, to collect, analyze, synthesize, and
disseminate relevant information on environmental health
matters."7 Among its environmental activities, WHO
supports its member states in the development of national
programs for the control of environmental health hazards
including air quality, water quality, radiation monitoring,
human exposure to pollutants, and environmental
epidemiology; and, to promote health through measures to
improve living conditions and to mitigate the adverse
environmental and health impacts of socio-economic
development actions."
WHO established a Committee on Pesticide Residues ("CPR")
which participates with the FAO in the evaluation of
pesticides at the annual Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues
("JMPR"I), and makes recommendations as to the acceptable
daily intake for specific compounds in humans."9 Some
countries use the data and recommendations of the FAO/WHO
committee, which are reviewed and published by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission ("CAC"), as a source for registering
17 Helge Ole Bergeson and Goerg Parmann (eds.), Green Globe
Yearbook on International Co-operation on Environment and
Development:1994, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Oxford University
Press, 1994, p. 288.
118 Id., p. 288.
119 Id., p. 358.
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pesticides. 12
WHO can offer important data collection, notification,
and monitoring assistance in the implementation of
regulatory programs established under the pesticide
convention. One specific recommendation is to use the
WHO/FAO as a clearing house for countries to submit and
receive scientific studies and technical information
compiled on chemical pesticides and new pest management
technologies.
4. The Codex System
The Codex system should also be reviewed to determine its
utility in the implementation of the proposed convention.
Codex Alimentarius Commission was established in 1962 by the
governing bodies of the FAO and WHO. "The Commission is an
international body engaged in the development of
international wholesome food standards, including pesticide
residue tolerances. The objective of the Commission is both
to safeguard consumer interests and to facilitate world
trade."'12  Established in 1966, the Codex Committee on
Pesticide residues was created to 'propose international
tolerances for pesticide residues in specific foods.' A
120 Id., p. 358-359. See also: Robert Boardman, Pesticides In
World Agriculture - The Politics of International Regulation, St.
Martin's Press, 1986.
121 U.S. EPA, note 116 supra, p.78.
further responsibility is the preparation of a list of
priorities of those pesticide residues found in food
commodities entering international trade, for toxicological
evaluation by the WHO Expert Committee on Pesticide Residues
and examination by FAO Working Party of Experts on Pesticide
Residues. ,122
5. Other Important IGOs
a. Monetary Organizations
The International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and the World
Bank 2 3, both specialized United Nations agencies, can
122 Id., p. 78, citing FAO-WHO, Procedural Manual, p. 68.
123 For a detailed discussion of the World Bank and its
redirection towards environment, including guidelines in lending
and environmental assessments, See: Kenneth Piddington, The Role
of the World Bank, in The International Politics of the
Environment, Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.),
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, pp. 212-227.
Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics,
Westview Press, 1991, p. 53-56, citing, in part, Testimony of Glenn
T. Prickett, Natural Resources Defense Council, before the House
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, April 3, 1990, note that
multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the
IMF are the most powerful IGOs in terms of direct impact on the
resources and environmental policies of LDCs. For example, the
World Bank has been the single greatest external influence on
energy policy in LDCs, and critics have charged that it has
contributed to global greenhouse warming. From 1981 through 1988,
the Bank invested heavily in power plants run on coal, funding a
total of 12,000 megawatts in developing countries. Meanwhile, it
devoted only 4 percent of its lending in the energy and industrial
fields to projects in end-use efficiency. In the end, however, the
Bank became the instrument for most industrialized countries to
channel funds into developing countries to help them comply with
global warming and other environmental agreements.
The IMF has also had an indirect influence on developing countries.'
offer assistance with the technical and financial mechanisms
needed to implement the objectives of the pesticide
convention, particularly in the establishment of sustained
agricultural systems, as discussed in Chapter VI below.
World Bank and Global Environment Facility
In recent years, "a remarkable transition has occurred in
the WB's lending for agricultural development. Between
1949 and 1984, the Bank shifted from a policy of 'benign
neglect' of agriculture to one that has led it to become
the world's single largest source of external capital for
investing in agriculture in developing countries. 14
The WB will very likely play a pivotal role in the
administration and implementation of monetary organizational
functions and in reviewing and implementing pest management
programs (both country specific and regional) in the
proposed pesticide convention. As example, an important
administrative function of the WB is oversight of the United
Nations financial mechanism known as Global Environment
Facility ("GEF") under the FCCC, which was established in
policies toward natural resources through its conditions on
structural adjustment loans, which require tightened credit,
government budget cuts, and other policies enabling its clients to
achieve a favorable balance and to repay loans. Environmental
critics have charged that IMF policies have contributed to the
stress on the natural resources bases in these countries because
the IMF conditions have often worsened the plight of the poorest
strata while creating perverse incentives for governmental
encouragement of more rapid logging of forest and more intensive
cultivation of export crops at the expense of soil fertility.
124 Montague Yudleman, The World Bank and Agricultural
Development - An Insider's View, World Resources institute, WRI
Paper # 1, 1985, p. 1.
1990 as a three-year, $1-billion pilot project. 25 The WB
administers GEF under close collaboration with UNDP and
UNEP.
GEF's stated goal is to help developing countries reduce
their contributions to the environmental problems of
global warming, biodiversity loss, pollution of
international waters, and ozone depletion. It seeks to
achieve this goal by providing modest incremental
resources to finance programs and projects affecting the
global environment... in a manner designed to test how
best to strengthen local analytical, regulatory and
monitoring capacity and to test means of sharing existing
and emerging technologies ...
GEF was created with [the following] objectives in mind:
to address potentially significant leadership to domestic
environmental parties, lobbies, and movements; and to
preempt efforts by developing countries to seize control
of the international environmental agenda during the
negotiation of the conventions on climate changes and
biodiversity protection.2 6
GEF's objectives were largely formulated by its funders:
mainly large polluting DCs such as the United States,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, many of whom have
some of the most stringent pesticide regulations in
existence. GEF came under fire on several grounds during
its pilot phase, and has suffered with institutional
125 David Fairman, Report of the Independent Evaluation of
the Global Environment Facility Pilot Phase, Environment, Vol. 36,
No.6, July/August 1994, p. 25.
126 Id., p.25, citing World Bank, Establishment of the Global
Environment Facility, Washington, D.C., April 1991, p. 4, and A.
Jordan, Paying the Incremental Costs of Global Environmental
Protection: The Evolving Role of the Global Environment Facility,
Environment, Vol. 36, No. 6, July/August 1994, p.12.
--- - - - ------
problems which arose from conflicts among its three
implementing agencies (WB, UNDP, and UNEP) over its budget,
policies, and operations. 7 Further, "it has been
criticized by NGOs for failing to move beyond discrete
'mitigation projects' to address distorted policy
incentives."' Most importantly, there is a perception
among LDC policymakers that GEF is biased in favor of DCs,
that it does not address developing countries' natural
environmental priorities, and may run contrary to their
economic priorities.19
The review of GEF's pilot phase was not positive - it was
determined by the GEF evaluation committee to be an
ineffective institution. "The evaluation identified four
major problems that GEF must address to become an effective
institution: unclear goals and strategies; problems in the
interagency structure and operations of GEF administration;
operational problems within each of the implementing
agencies; and inadequate participation by developing-country
127 Id., p. 26, citing United Nations Environment Programme,
United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank, Report of
the Independent Evaluation of the Global Environment Facility Pilot
Phase, Washington, D.C., November 23, 1993, pp. 150-54. See also:
Instruments for the Establishment of the Restructured Global
Environment Facility, Report of the GEF Participants Meeting,
Geneva, Switzerland, March 14-16, 1994, March 31, 1994.
128 Id.,p. 26.
129 Id., p.29.
governments, NGOs, and local communities in strategy,
program, and project development."' The evaluator's
recommendation is the formation of GEF II, a restructured
GEF. The most important changes include increased
representation of LDC nations on the GEF council to increase
LDCs participation and to dispel beliefs that GEF was biased
towards DCs - the council will include representatives from
16 LDCS, 14 DCs, and 2 economies in transition. Further,
the new GEF will have a 'functionally independent'
secretariat, which will be administratively supported by the
WB, but will report directly to the GEF council.3
A form of GEF II should be incorporated into the
pesticide agreement. Its key funders should be large
pesticide producing and exporting nations such as the United
States, the EC and Japan. However, decisions with regard to
approval and funding of specific projects should be made by
130 Id. p. 26-27. See also: Alexander Wood, The Interim
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol,
The Global Environment Facility: Sharing Responsibility for the
Biosphere, Vol. 2, WWF, 1993; David Fairman, Increments for the
Earth: the Global Environment Facility and Financial Transfers for
Global Environmental Problems, Paper for Discussion at Harvard/MIT
Joint Research Seminar on International Environmental Affairs,
October 13, 1994, Draft Version 2. 1; and, Peter H. Sand, Trust for
the Earth: New International Financial Mechanisms for Sustainable
Development, Symposium on Sustainable Development and International
Law (Baden bel Wien, April 14-16, 1994).
131 Mohamed T. El-Ashry, Chairman, GEF, The New GEF,
Commentary, Environment, Vol. 36, No.6, July/August 1994, p. 38.
the council, which should include representatives from not
only LDCs, but from LDCs with similar agricultural practices
and pest management problems. Its utility in the
implementation of the pesticide convention is perhaps
greater than in any other international agreement. This is
mainly because the near term solutions to the pesticide
problem are relatively simple and widely accepted -
transition to safe, alternative pest management systems
which can be easily implemented if the proper funding
mechanism is in place. These near term solutions in turn
advance long term goals, including pest management programs
which incorporate sustainable agricultural practices.
b. Commission on Sustainable Development ("CSD")
In May 1994, the second session of the United Nations
Commission on Sustainable Development ("CSD"), the body
established at UNCED to coordinate follow up to Agenda 21,
urged UNEP and FAO to develop an effective, legally binding
instrument for PIC. The CSD reported that "a strong
sentiment was expressed by participants to ... ban the export
of domestically prohibited chemicals from the OECD to other
countries". Two additionally intergovernmental bodies
endorsed developing a PIC convention.1 2 Although not much
other than sentiment has been expressed by the CSD to date,
132 Sandra Marquardt and Cathy Fogel, note 17 supra.
58
it may play an important role by assisting in the design and
implementation of the long term goal of the convention to
incorporate sustainable agricultural practices into pest
management.
C. International Labour Organization ("1ILO"I)
Another specialized United Nations intergovernmental
organization with utility in the pesticide convention is the
ILO. Established on April 11, 1979, the ILO's objective is
to establish social justice as the foundation for universal
and lasting peace, by unifying governments, employers, and
workers in common action to promote human rights, generate
employment, and improve living and working conditions. 3
"In the area of environment, the ILO's actions have been
extended beyond the traditional emphasis on occupational
safety and health and the working environment to include:
strengthening the role of trade unions and employers'
organizations in securing sustainable development;
environment and development training; employment, poverty,
and development issues; and environmental concerns related
to women, and indigenous and tribal peoples. 134
The ILO and WHO established the International Labour
Office-World Health Organization Committee of Occupational
133 Helge Ole Bergesen and Georg Parmann (eds.), note 117
supra, p. 270.
14 Id., p. 270
Health. In 1968, the Committee "undertook the task of
providing international communication among medical and
scientific experts concerning control of occupational
exposure to airborne toxic substances, including
pesticides".1 3 5 "The purpose of the Committee was to
develop recommendations for the guidance of all nations
concerning methodology for determining permissible limits
for exposure to such substances and, where possible to
develop definite limits for exposure to specific
substances."136 Importantly, "[t]he Committee published a
survey of legislation and practices concerning maximum
allowable airborne concentrations of a great number of
chemicals in the work environment (including many
pesticides) in 31 countries. However, it recommended for
international adoption the maximum allowable airborne
concentrations for only 24 chemicals. Only one of these,
parathion, is a pesticide".37
The ILO should be included as one of the important IGOs
to be consulted prior to the start of the negotiation of the
pesticide agreement. It could be used as a resource in the
13s U.S. EPA, note 116 supra, p. 84.
136 Id., p. 84, citing International Labour Organization,
Permissible Levels of Toxic Substances in the Working Environment,
p.1.
137 Id., p. 84.
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training of pesticide factory workers and agricultural
workers in the proper use, management, and disposal of
chemical pesticides.
d. World Food Programme
The UN World Food Programme ("WFP"),138 and the
International Fund for Agricultural Development ("IFAD"),
specialized United Nations agencies, may offer additional
assistance in the formulations of the pesticide convention.
The IFAD's objectives are, among others, to mobilize
additional resources to be made available on concessional
terms for agricultural development in member states; and, to
focus attention on the needs of the poorest rural
communities, in particular small farmers, the landless,
fishermen, livestock herders, and impoverished rural
women.13 9 It is financed mainly by voluntary contributions
from OECD and OPEC member states. In its first six years of
existence, it provided $1.6 billion in "soft" loans to 135
138 The WFP provides food aid to developing countries both to
promote economic and social development and to help meet emergency
needs. WFP-assisted development projects have traditionally fallen
almost exclusively within two broad categories: 1) agricultural and
rural development; and 2) human resource development. Citing from:
Helge Ole Bergesen and Georg Parmann (eds.), Green Globe Yearbook
on International Co-operation on Environment and Development: 1994,
The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Oxford University Press, p. 274.
139 Helge Ole Bergeson and Goerg Parmann (eds.), note 117
supra, p. 268.
agricultural projects in LDCs. 40 This agency has suffered
with funding problems in the mid 1980's. Negotiations to
replenish its core concluded in January 1986 - giving it a
further $460 million to lend through 1989.1 Much of
IFAD's loan assistance is concentrated in sub-Saharan
Africa. IFAD projects range from provision of farming
inputs and services (seed, fertilizers, tools, and
agricultural research and extension) to irrigation, storage
facilities, access roads, and credit to poor farmers and
workers who would have not had other sources of loans. 2
As most pesticide use in LDCs is tied to agriculture, as
part of the pre-negotiation process, IFAD should be reviewed
to determine if the incorporation of alternative, safe pest
management practices can be tied to its funding decisions.
Several other international organizations also play an
important role in pesticide regulations. Although the
decisions of these organizations generally do not supersede
the pesticide regulations of individual countries, the
decisions or recommendations of an international
organization may influence significantly the types of
regulations adopted by various countries. In addition,
14 Graham Hancock, Lords of Poverty, The Atlantic Monthly
Press, New York, 1989, p. 50.
141 Id.
142 Id., p. 268.
international organizations provide a forum in which the
pesticide regulators of various countries may discuss issues
of common interest."14 3
II. Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") and Pesticides
NGOs have played and continue to play important roles in
national and international pesticide issues. They will be
central to the connection between the public and the parties
to the negotiation of the pesticide convention. Many NGOs
have great technical capacity and may be of assistance in
operating farmer training programs in LDCs. They could also
assist in compiling and reviewing data (including assessing
data integrity) submitted under the monitoring requirements
of the convention.
The Union of Concerned Scientists (a group that promotes
alternatives to pesticides and alternatives to genetic
engineering),14 Greenpeace, The Pesticides Trust, the
143 J. Conner, Foreign and International Regulation of
Pesticides; U.S. Regulation of Exports and Imports, Chapter X,
Executive Enterprises Publications Report (1983), p. 334.
44 United Press International, Farming Today, December 27,
1993. The Union of Concerned Scientists ("Union"), through its key
spokesperson, Dr. Jane Rissler, has urged the United States
government to hold off on approvals for genetically altered crops
pending further research on potential ecological risks (such as the
May 1995 approval by EPA for Monsanto's production of genetically
altered "Newleaf" potato). A 92 page report released by the Union
cites a host of potential risks involved in releasing genetically
altered crops for production. Among them, the Union says, is the
chance the so-called transgenic crops could become weeds, or serve
as conduits through which new genes move to wild plants, which then
become weeds. The Union also wants more research into the
World Wildlife Fund for Nature ("WWF") and the Pesticide
Action Network are the most visible NGOs which advocate that
all governments stop their trade in banned chemicals, and
agree to provisions to limit trade on hazardous
chemicals."'5 Although the activities of these NGOs are
important in bringing the pesticide export problem to the
public forum, and in influencing the actions of the parties
to the negotiation, they cannot solve the pesticide exports
problems of the world. Their effectiveness lies in their
ability to "[fight] to eliminate hazardous pesticides and
toxic chemicals [usage] ... to urge their governments to make
full use of the ... PIC scheme... to support a new
convention which both strengthens PIC and goes beyond it...
[and] , to ensure that the convention contains provisions
enabling parties to implement global phaseouts of production
of high hazard chemicals".' It remains the essential
responsibility of the U.S., and other large chemical and
pesticide exporting DCs, to ensure that any international
possibility that virus-resistant crops could lead to the creation
of new viruses that might attack economically important
crops.. .that plants engineered to be herbicides - or pest resistant
could transfer those traits to noxious wild plants... and that
engineering to make plants produce their own drugs and pesticides
could pose a threat to wildlife. See also: Robert Greene, Pesticide
- Producing Spud Gets EPA Approval, The Associated Press, May 6,
1995.
's Sandra Marquart and Cathy Fogel, note 17 supra.
146 Id.
agreement regarding pesticide exports is at least as
stringent as regulations and policies in these nations.
III. Foreign Assistance, Aid Agencies and Pesticides
International development programs, such as those supported
by the U.S. Agency for International Development ("AID"') or
the World Bank, have primarily emphasized economic benefits.
Thus, in recent years, many have come under severe criticism
for their support of projects that result in environmental
degradation, and for implementing inconsistent policies and
practices between and often within LDC countries. They are
further criticized for their lack of coordination among
donors." 7 For example, "[dlistortions in national
development plans [have been found to] occur when too many
donors work on the same sector, even though the individual
projects may make sense"."'
"' Lee A. Kimball, Forging International Agreement
Strengthening Intergovernmental Institutions for Environment
and Development, World Resources Institute, New York, April
1992, pp. 49-55.
148 Id., p. 51; See also: Wilfredo Cruz and Robert Repetto,
The Environmental Effects of Stabilization and Structural
Adjustment Programs: The Philippines Case, World Resources
Institute, September 1992. According to Cruz and Repetto,
agricultural adjustment programs in the Philippines resulted
in soil erosion in hilly areas where corn and root crops are
grown. Forestry, as practiced, generally lead to
deforestation. Over-fishing occurs in most of the Philippines
fisheries, and mining depletes mineral reserves and pollutes
downstream farmlands and coastal fisheries. Petroleum and
power use also create pollution.
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AID recognizes that nations subject to food shortages or
epidemics of pest-borne diseases may be more willing to
accept the ecological risk attendant on the use of
persistent or highly toxic pesticides than nations without
such problems."' However, a number of considerations have
recently caused AID to change its policies and to adopt new
guidelines for the distribution of pesticides abroad under
the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program. These considerations
include:
1. The adoption of limits for pesticide residues by
many food importing countries and the growing
tendency toward worldwide limitation of pesticide
residues exemplified by the program of the Codex
Alimentarius Commission.
2. The findings of recent studies that in several
cases the application of non-selective, persistent
pesticides has destroyed normal biological
controls, leading to increase of other insect
populations and further use of pesticides to
destroy new pests. 50
As a result of these concerns, AID established and
distributed new instructions concerning "Procurement and Use
of AID-Financial Pesticides," effective February 12,
1971.11 Aid Manual Circular 1612.10.3 provides, among
"9 Id.
15 U.S. EPA, note 116 supra, p. 74
15 Id., p. 74, citing Council on Environmental Quality,
Environment Quality - 1970; the first annual report, p. 140,
209, U.S. Agency for International Development, Manual
Circular 1612, 10.3, February 12, 1971, p. 1-2.
other things, that AID Missions "must evaluate carefully
every proposed use of pesticides and consider every
available alternative", and that AID personnel must "make
sure that, where Codex or specific country pesticide
residues limits have been established, such limits are
considered before a given pesticide is used on a crop which
is or may be destined for export". Further, "AID mission
officials in Health, Food, and Agriculture, and Rural
Development are directed to encourage food exporting
countries to acquire technical competence in chemical
residues analysis, if they do not have it" and " Mission
personnel are informed that AID/Washington will provide
immediate 'backstopping' and technical assistance to
Missions in pest and disease problem identification and in
the procurement and usage of pesticides"." 2 To a large
extent, the problems associated with the export of banned or
canceled pesticides is due to the historical policies and
practices of foreign aid agencies, including the World Bank,
as discussed more fully in Chapter V. Like NGOs, foreign
assistance agencies can be a key source of both funding and
technical assistance in the implementation of alternative,
safe pest management policies and practices in LDCs.
Therefore, identification and coordination of purpose and
152 Id., p. 76.
efforts of agencies involved with agricultural development
is critical to the design and implementation of safe
programs. Conveners of the pesticide convention should
designate a special committee whose specific purpose is to
review such agencies to avoid the tendency to "reinvent
wheels" and to avoid duplication of work, all of which
promote efficiency.
IV. Existing National and Regional Institutions
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)
The OECD is an economic advisory organization founded in
1960. It's membership is open to states and regional
integration organizations. As of November 1993, there were
24 states and the Commission of the European Communities
with full membership. Five (5) states, the UNEP, the
Council of Europe, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe
(UN/ECE) have observer status." 3 "Between 1966 and 1969,
three meetings of the OECD subgroups expressed concern
regarding the presence of residues of persistent
organochlorides pesticides in the environment, and the
organization undertook three small-scale, cooperative,
13 Helge Ole Bergeson and Georg Parmann (eds.), note 117
supra, p. 274.
international monitoring programs involving pesticide
residues in wildlife. The second study program, begun and
completed in 1969, also included PCB residues; the third
study program (1969-71) included PCB and mercury." 5 4
Additionally, the OECD has established testing guidelines
for pesticides, and may sponsor conferences at which
pesticide regulators and manufacturers from different
countries discuss issues of common interest, including
pesticide regulation.'55
The OECD includes an Environment Policy Committee
("EPOC") (which replaced the 1970 OECD Environment Committee
in 1992). Its objectives are:
1) to provide a forum for members of the OECD to share
views on, and consider policy responses to, major
environmental issues and threats;
2) to encourage co-operation among member countries in
the pursuit of shared environmental objectives,
including inter-alia, coordinated consultation on
policies, approaches, and major actions taken or
proposed; data sharing; and joint research and
analysis;
14 U.S. EPA, note 116 supra, p.85, citing, in part, A. V.
Holden, Annex II - Report of Cooperative Study Programs 1966-
71, in Report of the Study Group on Unintended Occurrence of
Pesticides, (OECD), December 1970, p. 74-76.
1ss Id., p. 350-351.
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3) to promote, in support of sustainable development,
the integration of environmental and economic
policies, technological innovation and diffusion,
and protection of unique environmental values and
natural ecosystems;
4) to assess, on a systematic basis, the environmental
performance of member countries in relation to their
national and international policies and commitments;
5) to develop and promulgate environmental indicators,
and standardized, comparable sets of data and
statistics, as a basis for identifying environmental
trends, progress, and deficiencies in individual
member countries and the OECD as a whole;
6) to promote the sharing with non-member countries of
environmental expertise, information, and experience
which reside in member countries and the OECD;
7) to ensure that the views and expertise of private
sector institutions are drawn upon in the conduct of
OECD's environmental work, utilizing the OECD's
Business and Industry Advisory Committee ("BIAC")
and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD
("TUAC"). 156
The OECD's Environment Policy Committee has developed a
Chemicals Programme. Its objective is to promote
cooperation in controlling chemicals on the commercial
market.157 The work of the OECD in the area of pesticides
is significant. It is therefore important that the UNEP and
negotiators of the pesticide convention examine the OECD
pesticide policies and programs to: 1) borrow those which
meet the objectives of the convention; and 2) use the OECD
156 Helge Ole Bergesen and Georg Parmann (eds.), note 117
supra, p. 274.
157 Id., p. 274.
resources, including technical and legal assistance.
The European Union and PIC
The European Union ("EU") has made the PIC procedure
legally binding on member states under Regulation 2455/92.6
The EU has not yet considered including a prohibition on the
export of any banned chemicals; although, in 1991, the
European Parliament adopted a proposal which stated that
bans and restrictions on certain chemicals in the EU should
also apply to their export outside of the EU. A conference
to discuss and clarify EU policy on export of banned
products will be held in July 1995.5
The European Economic Community ("EEC") and Pesticides
The EEC has the authority, upon approval by its members,
to issue directives that are binding upon member states. 5 9
Past directives issued by the EEC relate to the
classification, packaging and labeling of dangerous
substances or preparations. The Council of Europe
158 Sandra Marquardt and Cathy Fogel, note 17 supra.
19 Helge Ole Bergesen and Georg Parmann (eds.), note 117
supra, p. 351.
160 Id., p. 352. For example, J. Conner noted that formulated
pesticide products and preparations are regulated under
Directive 78/631/EEC and its first Amendment, 81/187/EEC. The
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("COE") published a booklet entitled Pesticides in 1962
(which has been amended several times) which sets forth a
system, albeit somewhat idealistic, for the national
registration of pesticides by its member states.1
The convention organizers and negotiators for the
pesticide convention may find important utility in existing
national institutions. For example, the United States'
Pesticide Monitoring Improvements Act ("PMIA"), requires the
Food and Drug Administration to develop an automated
information system for collecting, summarizing, and
evaluating its pesticide-monitoring data on imported
products.6 The program is not completely effective, but
serves an important monitoring and data collection function.
The FDA has developed an automated computer system called
the Import Support and Information System ("IRIS") to
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency's
Annexes to the directive classify pesticides into seven
categories according to acute toxicity and concentration of
active ingredient (s), and provide appropriate symbols and
labeling statements indicating the nature of the risk and
safety advice. This directive was late in implementation, and
it as well as others issued by the EEC may have been amended.
Another directive proposed by the EEC attempts to harmonize
the registration systems for pesticides in EEC member states.
161 Id., p. 354.
162 GAO, Pesticides: Status of FDA's Efforts to Improve
Monitoring and Enforcement, Statement of Richard L. Hembra,
Director, Environmental Protection Issues, Resources,
Community, and Economic Development Division, GAO/RCED-93-55
(June 16, 1993), p. 2.
program for monitoring imported products, including food.
Unfortunately, IRIS has suffered with implementation
problems."'3 If implemented, "IRIS is expected to enhance
FDA's ability to detect and prevent entry of violative
products, reduce the amount of staff time spent on
processes, produce more consistent sampling decisions
through uniform application of monitoring criteria, and
deter, 'port shopping'"." 4 Although the system has not
been fully implemented, its objectives are important.
Similar programs, with varied records of success, exists in
other countries.
Currently, U.S. pesticide laws are under review,
particularly regarding pesticide residue levels in food and
pesticide exports. The problems, pitfalls, and successes to
come in the process of congressional debate and decision,
and the reformulation of U.S. pesticide law and policy may
be a useful model for negotiators of the pesticide
agreement.
Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands are the leading
163 Baender. note 20 supra, p, 2.
164 Id., p. 2-3. "Port shopping" is the process whereby
importers search for the U.S. port of entry that will provide
them with the best opportunity for receiving FDA approval to
release their products into commerce.
nations in the design and implementation of pesticide
regulations and policies based on human health and
environmental considerations. Although these reforms come
under some criticisms, they are proving to be effective."'5
Also notable is the union between the Inter-American
Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture of the Organization
of American States and the International Pesticide
Manufacturers Association. They met and agreed to implement
uniform labeling requirements on pesticides, which included
additional human and environmental safety and health data,
disposal information, and color coded toxicity information
based on an international color scheme. 6
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Although the United Nations IGOs, national and regional
organizations, and certain NGOs have attempted to formulate
165 Peter Groenewegen and Wianne Brandt, Institutional Barriers
to Change: Agriculture, Pesticides and the Environment, Paper
for Greening of Industry Conference 12-15 November 1994,
Copenhagen.
166 Id., p. 12. See: John Picarazzi, Regulating the Exports of
Hazardous Pesticides: In Search of An Ecological World Order,
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1989,
p. 431, for a discussion of an ecological approach to world
pesticide use problems. See also: Daniel Faber, Environment
Under Fire: Imperialism and the Ecological Crisis in Central
America, Monthly Review Press, 1993.
agreements or requirements regarding the registration,
testing and exportation of hazardous substances, including
pesticides, their success rate is varied and often poor.
Notably, the United States has often not participated in
these international organizations, and when it did,
objections were frequently voiced to the proposals and
policies recommended. And, American chemical and pesticide
industry and trade organizations have historically used
their power to promote their own economic interest, even
when they acknowledge the existence of problems with the
U.S. pesticide export system. Participation by large
chemical and pesticide exporting nations is important if the
efforts of IGOs, NGOs, and other organizations is to lead to
the negotiation of the legally binding international
agreement on pesticides.
Many IGOs, NGOs, national and regional institutions will
prove important to the pesticide convention. The experience
of organizations such as FAO, WHO, and OECD in dealing with
the problem of pesticide exports is significant, although
their rates of success in tackling pesticide exports
problems is poor or targeted to a limited audience (OECD)
It is recommended that the conveners of the proposed
pesticide convention examine these existing institutions, as
well as other international agreements which have attempted
to regulate the export of hazardous chemicals and wastes
(Bamako and the Basel Convention), to determine what
assistance, if any, these organizations can offer in the
pesticide convention.
CHAPTER IV
Negotiation Process and Procedure in the Pesticide
Convention
I. Introduction
Negotiation is the first procedure listed in the United
Nations Charter.16 7 This Charter states: "[t]he parties to
any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation (emphasis
added), inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangement, or other peaceful settlement of their own
choice". 16
Yet, negotiation at the international level, particularly
on matters pertaining to the environment, are extremely
difficult. There have been numerous calls for the
167 United Nations Charter, Article 33.
168 Alheritiere, Dominique, Settlement of Public International
Disputes on Shared Resources: Elements of a Comparative Study
on International Instruments, Natural Resources Journal, Vol.
25, July 1985, pp. 701-2, citing: 1 Internationales
Umweltrecht-Multilaterales Vergrage 945:477/1 (W. Burhenne,
ed.), 1974.
.................
negotiation of more effective international environmental
agreements."' Susskind and Osawa note that:
[w]hile the existing treaty-making process has produced
dozens of multilateral environmental agreements over the
past four decades, most of these are limited in scope,
and few have actually reduced pollution levels, corrected
the misuse of critical natural resources, or
substantially modified the patterns of development that
would otherwise have occurred. At best, they have
prompted some countries to forestall actions that would
have accelerated the process of environmental
deterioration.
The process of multilateral environmental negotiation
typically involves negotiation at two levels, and they occur
simultaneously: regionally and globally. "At the regional
and global level, environmental problems are addressed in a
multitude of negotiation processes, in various ways,
"9 Lawrence Susskind and Connie Osawa, Negotiating More
Effective International Environmental Agreements, in The
International Politics of the Environment, Andrew Hurrell and
Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, pp.
143-165;Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy:
Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements, Oxford
University Press, New York, 1994; Caroline Thomas The
Environment in International Relations, _Institute of
International Affairs, Royal, London, 1992;
Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstances and
Choice in International Relations, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, 1990.
170 Id., p. 143, citing Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond
Environmental Diplomacy: The Changing Institutional Structure
of International Cooperation,in International Environmental
Diplomacy, John Carroll (ed.), Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1988, p. 13-28, and John Carroll, Conclusions, in
International Environmental Diplomacy, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 275-79.
engaging numerous international agendas."' The issues to
be negotiated are generally viewed as "risky" and "highly
complex and characterized by insufficient knowledge and
background information when negotiations commence."12
Thus, a variety of negotiating, decision-making, and
advisory roles (including scientific and technical) are
necessary."3 Issues and positions are often politically
motivated, highly volatile, and extremely complex, and
asymmetrical in that they involve "negotiation between
states with greatly divergent structural power and
resources"." 4 This results in treaties or agreements
which reflect the lowest common denominator between the
parties. These types of agreements are well documented.7 5
17' Gunnar Sjostedt (ed.) International Environmental
Negotiation, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, London, 1993, p.
xiv. See generally: Richard B. Bilder, Managing the Risks of
International Agreement, The University of Wisconsin Press,
1981.
172 Id., p. 2.
"7 Id., p. 21.
174 William Mark Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International
Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain With Strong Nations, The
John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1988, citing, I.
William Zartmann, The Politics of Trade Negotiation Between
Africa and the European Economic Community, p. 5.
"s Peter H. Sand, International Cooperation: The Environmental
Experience, in Preserving the Global Environment: The
Challenge of Shared Leadership, Jessica Tuchman Mathews (ed.),
W.W. Norton & Company, New York 1991. p. 241. See generally:
Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More
Effective Global Agreements, Oxford University Press, New
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To complicate these issues further, even the simple question
of what is environmental negotiation,"16 is difficult to
define in this context.
II. Characteristics of International Environmental
Negotiations
In his article entitled Negotiations on the
Environment,1 7 7 Winfried Lang, pinpoints some of the
distinctive attributes of negotiation on the environment.
In his estimation, the following factors distinguish
international environmental negotiations from others:
1) Lobbies defending ecological or business interests
do not only influence decision making at the
national level; they also try to participate in the
intergovernmental negotiation itself.
2) The role of media is probably much greater in
multilateral negotiations on the environment than in
other multilateral negotiations, such as those on
disarmament or trade. The main reason is that
matters of environmental protection have become a
major focus of public attention, because each and
every individual feels concerned.
York, 1994.
176 See generally: Dale M. Gorczynski, Insider's Guide to
Environmental Negotiation, Lewis Publishers, Inc., 1991.
Gorczynski notes that, at least at the national level,
environmental negotiation is variously defined by the parties
to the negotiation (i.e. activists and NGOs, politicians,
lawmakers, lobbyists, etc.).
"? Winfried Lang, Negotiations on the Environment, in V.A.
Kremenyuk, International Negotiations: Analysis, Approaches,
Issues, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1991, pp. 343-
356.
3) Scientific evidence (on actual or potential damage
to the environment) competes with considerations of
economic feasibility; this reflects also the
underlying conflict of interests between
antagonistic lobbies.
4) The outcome of these negotiations (agreement,
treaties) is rarely final, they are likely to be
reopened either to include new substances in
existing regimes or to expand quantitatively these
control measures.
5) The outcome is frequently of a step-by-step nature;
to overcome resistance to control measures, the
first step is sometimes only a framework agreement
which is followed some years later by supplementary
agreements containing stringent obligations."
The 1993 publication of the Processes of International
Negotiation ("PIN") Project, International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 179 outlines
the key distinctive attributes of environmental
negotiations:
1) multiple parties and multiple roles;
2) multiple issues, including singular issue
multiplication;
3) meaningless boundaries (i.e. transboundary
pollution);
4) scientific and technical uncertainty;
178 Id., p. 355.
179 Processes of International Negotiation ("PIN") Project,
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,
Laxenburg, Austria, 1993, See generally: Howard Raiffa,
Contributions of Applied Systems Analysis to International
Negotiation, in V.A. Kremenyuk, International Negotiation:
Analysis, Approaches, Issues, Jossey-Bass Publishers, Inc.,
San Francisco, 1991, pp. 5-21.
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5) power asymmetry;
6) joint interest;
7) negative perceptions of immediate outcomes;
8) long time frame;
9) changing actors;
10) public opinion;
11) institutionalization of solutions (i.e. role of
existing institutions in addressing problems - UNEP,
WHO, FAO, etc.); and,
12) new regimes and rules.
Internationally negotiated environmental agreements are
typically non-binding "paper treaties," whose terms are
either ignored or not enforced. Richard Nixon commented
(primarily in the context of treaty making in the face of
war and peace):
[h]istory is a pathetic junkyard of broken treaties ...
'friendship treaties' do not necessarily express or
create friendship ... International relations are ...
like entering a snake pit where good intentions ...
adhered to slavishly in the face of your enemy's
malevolence, are bound to be distinct hindrances.
Unless agreements are self-enforcing they will not last
(emphasis added). It is a reflection of the great
difficulty of meaningful negotiation between adversaries
that such agreements, amid all of history's friendship
treaties and nonaggression pacts, have been few and far
between.18
David Sanders correctly notes in his work Lawmaking and
Co-Operation in International Politics: The Idealist Case
Re-Examined that "there are far too many historical examples
of nation-states entering into treaty commitments which they
have no intention of carrying out to sustain the belief that
treaties of themselves will not solve any of the great
dilemmas of international politics."' This is no truer
than in the case of international agreements on the
environment, and especially so in the face of disagreement
as to the significance and severity of environmental
problems.
A key reason that many international environmental
treaties are not followed is that they impose symmetric
obligations on all parties when the parties are not
equal.1 2 The "same thing" approach is perhaps the most
significant barrier to encouraging more nations to
participate in international environmental negotiations,
180 David Sanders, Lawmaking and Co-Operation in International
Politics: The Idealist Case Re-Examined, St. Martin's Press,
New York, 1986, p. 3, citing Richard Nixon, Real Peace
Little, Brown, Boston, 1984, p. 12-14.
11 Id., p. 3.
182 Edward A. Parsons and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Equal Measures
and Fair Burdens: Negotiating Environmental Treaties in An
Unequal World, Harvard University, J.F.K. School of
Government, undated.
and, as noted, is the crux to non-compliance.
The prevalence of symmetric measures in environmental
treaties is puzzling, because the nations participating are
often highly asymmetric in their relevant interests.
Nations can differ both in the benefits they derive from
the environment being improved, and in the costs they incur
from undertaking measures themselves to improve it.'83
Recently, international agreements such as the FCCC have
attempted to treat unequal parties differently. This trend,
as currently approached, has not solved the problem of
increasing the number of parties to these agreements,
implementation, and compliance. Here, according to Parsons and
Zeckhauser, "the differences tend to be of a highly
constrained kind. For example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol
[ozone treaty] imposes a schedule of phased CFC reductions
leading to 50% cuts in 1999 for industrial countries, while
developing countries were to meet each reduction target 10
years later. This '10-year grace period' for developing
countries has been retained in both subsequent amendments of
the Treaty".184
In the case of pesticides convention, there are two key
initial barriers to negotiation of an effective agreement.
First, many of the pesticide exporting nations, including
183 Id., p. 8.
184 Id., p. 7.
exporters of banned and canceled pesticides, do not believe
there exists an imminent need for an international agreement.
Second, and more troubling, is that fact that many importing
LDCs do not view the pesticide problem as significant,
particularly where imports are tied to aid packages and other
types of foreign assistance.
The negotiations required for the establishment of a
framework convention on the pesticides question will be
especially complex. This is one of the clearest cases
involving asymmetric parties - the difference between most DCs
and LDCs reliance on agriculture is generally significant.
Thus, " [o]ne nation might find it more costly than another to
restrain its activities contributing to a particular form of
environmental harm. Its economy may be more dependent on a
particular harmful activity in aggregate, or may have more
limited opportunities to substitute away from it at low cost.
The difference may reflect different structures of capital
stock, natural resource endowments, or levels of technological
development".185 More importantly, research has adequately
demonstrated that "the transmission of harm" between DCs and
LDCs and "the means available to control environmental
harm"1 " is asymmetric in the case of pesticides.
85
185 Id., p. 9.
186 Id.
The pesticide convention should be symmetric18 7 in its
objectives and prohibitions (including timetables for the ban,
use, and export of certain hazardous pesticides and pesticide
chemicals) , but asymmetric in its methodologies for the
implementation of alternative, safe pest management practices.
Such an agreement therefore requires the active input of all
parties concerned to ensure the design and implementation of
workable country specific and/or regional pest management
programs. The programs must include stringent targets and
timetables and financial and technology transfers, among other
things.
Susskind presents perhaps the most comprehensive, yet
simple analysis of the weaknesses with current international
environmental treaty-making systems and practices in his 1994
book entitled Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More
Effective Global Agreements. He notes that there are three
(3) serious obstacles (among others) currently to global
cooperation on the environment: 1) the North-South conflict;
2) the question or problem of sovereignty; and 3) the lack of
incentives to bargain. 188
187 Id., p. 9-16. Many of the advantages in the use of
symmetric agreements outlined by Parsons and Zeckhauser are
applicable to the pesticide convention.
188 Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating
More Effective Global Agreements, Oxford University Press, New
York, 1994, pp.18-23.
An inadequate legal structure, and fundamental flaws in the
convention-protocol approach to international environmental
negotiations are also identified by Susskind as key problems
in the current process of multilateral negotiations on the
environment.189 All of these problems will inevitability
surface in multilateral negotiations over pesticides. This
chapter seeks, through a review of international negotiation
theory and practice concerning the environment, to outline
possible methods to avoid some of these problems. It is
believed that questions of sovereignty, incentives to bargain,
and North-South conflict can be resolved for the large
majority of parties necessary to the negotiation of this
convention. The more difficult problems of an inadequate
legal structure and deficiencies in the convention-protocol
approach to negotiation will be lessened (not resolved) by
resolution of the first three problems.
III. Key Parties and Their Sources of Power to the
Negotiation of a Framework Convention on Pesticide
Exports
Success in the negotiation of the pesticide convention
requires the active and meaningful participation of several
parties. In sum, these parties include, in addition to DCs
and LDCs (particularly those heavily involved in pesticide
189 Id., pp. 24-42.
manufacture and exports and those involved heavily in
agricultural development - and therefore pest management): 1)
certain IGOs (UNEP, FAO, WHO, CSD, all discussed more fully in
Chapter III); 2) certain advisory organizations such as the
OECD; 3) regional organizations such as the EU; 4) industry;
5) NGOs (including those with legal, technical, and political
expertise); and financial institutions such as the WB (GEF),
among others.
The keys to the successful negotiation of a framework
convention on pesticide exports can be viewed as threefold: 1)
the active participation of key parties; 2) LDCs exertion of
their power, to influence the process and outcome of the
negotiations; 9 0 and, 3) large exporting DCs utilization of
their national and international influence to bring the
necessary parties to the negotiation table.
Large Pesticide Producing Nations
Most important to the pesticide negotiation is the presence
and meaningful participation of large producing and exporting
19 For a good discussion of the outcomes in international
negotiations, see: Arild Underdal, The Outcomes of
Negotiation, in V.A. Kremenyuk, International Environmental
Negotiations: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, Jossey-Bass
Publishers, San Francisco, 1991, pp.100-115.
nations, such as the United States and Germany, in the
negotiation of the pesticide convention. After all, the
exports of their agricultural products and technologies are
the central cause of the human health and environmental
problems which flow from pesticide use in LDCs. These nations
generally bring influence and other forms of power (industry
support through promotion of research grants and other
incentives for development of new technologies and safer
products, promises of financial and technical support to LDCs,
threat of sanctions, withholding of aid, etc.) to the
negotiating table. Thus, the support of key exporting nations
can greatly influence others (DCs as well as LDCs) in the
negotiations.
Other DCs are also important to the successful negotiation
of the pesticide agreement, in particular, those which have
stringent and measurably successful pesticide laws and
regulations. Specifically, certain regional organizations
such as the EU which has specific pesticide policies (which
are often binding on its members) can be of great political
and organizational influence in the pesticide convention
negotiations based on their experience in negotiating
agreements among their members.
Specific DCs, such as the United States, Denmark, Sweden
and the Netherlands, all nations which have gone or are
undergoing re-engineering of their pesticide laws and
policies, can also offer policy formulation, legal, and
technical assistance in these negotiations.
LDCs: Large Pesticide Consumers
The other major group of parties necessary to the
negotiation of the pesticide convention is of course LDCs,
particularly those with a large agricultural production base.
As this thesis has demonstrated, these countries suffer
disproportionate incidents of the adverse human health and
environmental damages associated with pesticide use.
Depending on the issue, LDCs input and power has often been
viewed as minor or immaterial in international environmental
negotiations. However, as environmental problems and
transboundary pollution have taken on a global context, LDCs
have begun to express and exert significant levels of power or
influence in the negotiation process.' Therefore, in order
to initiate meaningful negotiation for a framework convention
191 For example, in the on-going negotiations regarding climate
change, particularly on the question of joint implementation,
many LDCs have played a critical role in the negotiation of
the terms of the FCCC.
on pesticide exports, there must be recognition by DCs of the
complete sovereignty of all nations, as well as recognition of
the imbalance between: 1) commitment and power; and 2) actual
control and power between DCs and LDCs.
According to I. William Zartmann, so-called "weak" nation--
states (presumably many LDCS), have three principal sources of
power: "1) weak states can provoke an encounter by influencing
agendas and raising points; 2) they can put forward their
needs, thus pinning moral obligations on the strong; and, 3)
weak states have the power to agree, and conversely, the power
to withhold agreement. " 1 9 2
Weak nations power also comes in the forms of "aggregate
structural power," "issue-specific structural power," and
"tactical" power.1 93
Aggregate structural power refers to "an actor's resources,
capabilities, and position vis-a-vis the external world as
a whole... Aggregate structural power is defined as the
actor's total (or aggregate) resources and possessions...
In the case of nation-states, it means total national
resources - demographic, economic, and military.194
192 William Mark Habeeb, note 174 supra, p.5, citing I. William
Zartmann, The Politics of Trade Negotiation Between Africa and
The European Economic Community.
193 Id.
"4 Id., p. 17.
It is not only concerned with identifying national resources.
It is also concerned with national potential, the generalized
ability to actualize resources.' "Issue specific structural
power is concerned with an actor's capabilities and position
vis-a-vis another actor in terms of a specific structure of a
relationship. "1 96  Tactical power is the actor's ability to
use its power resources to attain objectives.' 9 7 According
to Habeeb, "in interstate negotiations, the nature of the
actor's issue power balance largely determines the process and
outcome". 98 Further, "the objective of tactical power in
negotiation is to alter the issue power balance in a more
favorable direction." 99  Habeeb also reached the
following conclusions:
1) Issue-specific structural power is the most critical
component of power in asymmetrical negotiation.
2) Control is the single most important component of
issue power.
3) The resources of aggregate structural power may
increase alternatives and control but cannot increase
commitment. .
4) Because a weak actor generally has more at stake in
negotiation with a strong actor, it will devote more
attention and energy to achieving its desired outcome.
195 Id., p. 17.
196 Id., p. 19.
197 Id., p. 129.
198 Id., p. 129.
199 Id.
5) The weak state can bring about a change in the issue
power balance only through the use of tactics not
based on aggregate structural power.
6) The weak state faces better in negotiations in which
it is defending against a perceived injustice by the
strong state.
7) Real or perceived weakening of the strong state's
aggregate structural power can alter the issue power
balance in the weak state's favor.
8) Contextual events and systemic changes may critically
affect the issue power balance.
9) Negotiations conclude when one or both of the parties
feel that the costs of an agreement are less than the
costs of further altering the issue power balance.
10) Negotiation outcomes ratify the issue power balance
between the two sides.200
IV. A Theory of Negotiation
The first question is whether in fact, there is such a
thing as a viable theory of international environmental
negotiation. Research has revealed that among and between
negotiations experts (including international negotiation
experts) and environmental experts there is wide disagreement
as to what is an effective approach to international
environmental negotiations. It is this thesis' view that many
existing theories concerning international environmental
negotiation are useful, but, that there is no finite, foul-
200 Id., p. 138.
proof approach. Several of the best recommendations for
negotiation of the pesticide convention follow.
Negotiation Through Existing UN Diplomatic Channels
This thesis advocates utilization of much of the existing
United Nations system of negotiation, with allowance for
modifications to reflect the parties' interest and
concerns.201 Negotiation between states is usually conducted
through 'normal diplomatic channels,' that is by the
respective foreign offices, or by diplomatic representatives,
who in the case of complex negotiations may lead delegations
including representatives of several interested departments of
governments concerned.202
Nesting of Parties
All nation-states with a strong agricultural base should
participate in the international negotiation of a pesticide
agreement. Unfortunately, maybe this is idealistic.
201 This includes, among other things, the creation of a
Conference of Parties, a Secretariat, and specialized
committees designed to carry out specific functions for the
Conference of Parties, etc.
202 J. C. Merrils, International Dispute Settlement, 2ed. ,
Grotius Publications Ltd., 1991, p.8.
One viable alternative is to "nest" the parties. Parsons and
Zeckhauser's proposal for "nested negotiations" may assist the
negotiation of a pesticide agreement. In their view:
Many of the difficulties to negotiation... are consequences
of the large number of nations participating in
negotiations. To the extent that the number of effective
participants in a negotiation can be reduced, the
difficulties are mitigated ... The most widely used of
these approaches is to group participating nations into a
few classes whose members are similarly situated, agree
that all members of a class will do the same thing, and
negotiate over what the 'same thing' will be for each
class. If the set of all negotiating nations is too
diverse for all to take the same measures, but they fall
into a few clear, politically salient, internally
homogenous categories, then this approach can yield easily
negotiable and efficient agreements. 2 0 3
For the purposes of the pesticide convention there are
several possibilities for division of the parties into
classes. The most obvious is along regional or agricultural
production lines - countries which produce similar
agricultural products and which have similar pest management
needs. For example, Latin America, East Asia, and the
European Union (formerly the EC) might be primary classes,
with nations such as Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands
(among others) who have similar agricultural and pest
management programs, being a subclass. This theory of nesting
of parties should be fully explored by the convention
203 Parsons and Zeckhauser, note 182 supra, pp. 31-32.
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organizers and by the parties.
Creation of Incentives to Negotiate
To initiate negotiations for the framework convention on
pesticide exports, the parties necessary to the negotiations
must have incentives to negotiate. Peter H. Sand best
describes this requirement as "selective incentives. " 2 0 4
"The concept of 'selective incentive' is well established in
economic group theory as one of the motives for collective
action: certain fringe benefits may persuade a party to
participate in a program or standard that it would otherwise
find unacceptable. " 2 0s "The selective incentives commonly
used in environmental treaty bargaining are access to funding,
access to resources, access to markets, and access to
technology.2 06 But, selective incentives can also have
negative impacts: they can lead to "special treatment for
selected parties... and otherwise skew a symmetrical system of
reciprocal rights and obligations".20 7
204 Peter H. Sand, note 175 supra, p. 242.
205 Id., p. 242.
206 Id., p.242.
207 Id., p.244.
Phased Negotiation
a. Pre-negotiation or Diagnostic Phase
International negotiations on environment usually takes
place in phases.2 0 The pre-negotiation or diagnostic phase
is the period in which each party explores the costs and
benefits of a negotiated solution and reaches the decision to
negotiate.209
In general, two characteristics must be present for the
diagnostic phase to end with a decision to begin
negotiating: 'The parties agree that they need a solution
and that their decision on a solution must be unanimous.'
This decision is reached before formal interaction between
the actors; negotiation, as such, has not begun. Rather,
in the diagnostic phase each actor is assessing the
possibility that negotiation is in order. Though this
assessment may be strongly affected by the course of
events, it is essentially an internal decision-making
process. The key factor . . . is will: [w] ithout the will to
reach an agreement there will be none.21
It appears that the diagnostic phase is underway in the case
of the pesticide convention. Unfortunately, this is inspite
of the fact that all necessary parties, particularly the DCs
who are large producers and exporters of pesticides have not
demonstrated sufficient support for these negotiations.
208 Habeeb, note 174 supra, p. 29.
209 Id.
210 Id.
b. Formula, Detail and Outcome Phase
Habeeb' s 21  theory of phased international negotiations
continues with the advancement of the formula, detail, and
outcome phases. They are self-explanatory. Although not
referred to in such terms generally, one form or another of
these phases occur in most types of negotiation. A phased,
fluid, approach in negotiations over the pesticide convention
are necessary and inevitable. What will occur specifically in
each phase cannot be predicted with any level of accuracy, as
all the parties and their specific issues and interests are
not yet known. The pre-negotiation phase is therefore central
to the identification of parties, issues and interests.
V. Conclusion and Recommendations
This chapter has presented several of the key problems
anticipated in the negotiation of an international agreement
regarding pesticide exports. It has not, and can not attempt
to answer the difficult question of how to resolve some of the
persistent and significant problems which plague and
characterize both general international negotiations and
international environmental negotiations. Indeed, "efforts to
211 Id.
understand and improve international negotiations will
increasingly have to take into account the complexity and
unpredictability of such negotiations and of the systems in
which they are embedded. The reasons for this are the impact
of interdependence and globalization, and the fact that the
real systems are becoming more complex". 2 "'
And, "[i] t is necessary to consider the processes associated
with international negotiations in the context of their
cultural and political environments. Negotiations are
dependent not only on the system in which they are embedded
but also on the various perceptions of those involved. Thus,
it is important to identify and deal with the impacts of
cultural, political, and psychological factors on
international negotiations" 23
The conclusion is that there is no viable model or theory
of negotiation which will ensure the success of the
negotiations in the pesticide convention. It is recommended
that a fluid and easily modifiable version of the United
Nations negotiation system be used to advance negotiations
over the pesticide question.
212 Frances Mautner-Markhof, Processes of International
Negotiations, Westview Press, Inc., 1989, p.1.
213 Id.
CHAPTER V
Design and Implementation Obstacles and Solutions in
Negotiation of the Pesticide Convention
I. Introduction
"[W] hatever it is that we will be able to agree upon and to
adopt must be implemented. That implementation must be
carefully monitored and assessed and its progress must be
carefully evaluated. "21 4  There is not greater weakness in
international environmental agreements than the lack of
effective implementation of the provisions of these
agreements. The reasons for this are varied. Susskind notes:
[t]here are several reasons that signed international
agreements ... often produce little if any real
improvement. First, it often takes so long to secure
international cooperation that environmental protection
strategies that made sense when they were first proposed
represent 'too little, too late' by the time they are
implemented... [Further], it often costs more to
implement environmental treaties than the signatories
anticipated. Although they are listed among the
signatories, some countries may actually renege when
changing domestic priorities make it impossible for them to
214 Emil Salim, Minister of State for Population and
Environment, Indonesia, June 5, 1992, quoted in S. Jacob
Scherr and Jared E. Blumenfeld, Implementing UNCED, in
Phillipe Sands (ed) Greening International Law, The New York
Press, 1994, p.227.
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live up to their original intentions.215
David G. Gow and Elliot R. Morss identify the self-
explanatory "notorious nine" problems that impede large scale
development projects, which are directly applicable to
implementation problems with international environmental
agreements. The notorious nine include:
1) political, economic, and environmental constraints;
2) institutional realities;
3) personnel constraints;
4) technical assistance shortcomings;
5) decentralization and participation;
6) timing;
7) information systems;
8) differing agendas; and,
215 Lawrence Susskind, note 188 supra, p. 14.
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9) sustaining project benefits.2"
Effective implementation is influenced predominately by
detailed preparation and appraisal2 ", and is the "stuff"
between policy reform and program outcomes.2
[Tihe task of implementation is to establish a link
that allows the goal of public policies to be realized
as outcomes of governmental activity. It involves,
therefore, the creation of a 'policy delivery system'
in which specific means are designed and pursued in
the expectation of arriving at particular ends.
The general process of implementation thus begins only
when general goals and objectives have been specified,
when action programs have been designed, and when
funds have been allocated for the pursuit of the
goals.219
21 David D. Gow and Elliot R. Morss, The Notorious Nine:
Critical Problems in Project Implementation, World
Development, Vol. 16, No. 12, 1988, pp. 1399-1418.
21 Dennis Rodinelli, Planning and Implementing Development
Projects: An Introduction, Planning Development Projects,
Dennis Rodinelli (ed.) Dowden, Strausberg, 1977, p. 22.
218 Merilee S. Grindle, Policy Conternt and Context in
Implementation, Politics and Policy Implementation in the
Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980, p.6.
See also: John W. Thomas and Merilee Grindle, After the
Decision: Implementing Policy Reforms in Developing Countries,
World Development, XVIII, 8, 1990, pp. 1163-1181. Thomas and
Grindle advance a framework for implementation of policy
reforms that requires lo6king at it as a long-term process of
decision making and focuses attention on the fact that all
policy reforms will encounter antagonistic reactions. These
can be overcome more easily if policy elites develop a
specific strategy for the implementation of reforms. The
starting point for such a strategy is an analysis of the
characteristics of a particular reform.
219 Id., pp. 6-7.
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This chapter seeks to identify the criteria and tools
necessary for the successful implementation of the pesticide
convention. It identifies important pre-negotiation and post-
negotiation implementation activities, and reviews traditional
implementation obstacles in international environmental
agreements. It concludes with several specific recommendations
for implementation of the pesticide convention.
II. Implementation of Organizational Functions As Part of the
Negotiation Process
The effectiveness of the institutional arrangements for
implementing international environmental agreements is the key
to their success, where success is measured by the parties'
compliance with the stated purpose and specific requirements
of the agreement. David G. Victor et. al. 220, present
several recommendations for the international community to
implement the needed organizational initiatives which are
prerequisites to the successful implementation of
international agreements. A list of the general criteria for
these initiatives includes: a prompt beginning; flexibility;
220 David G. Victor et. al. Pragmatic Approaches to Regime
Building for Complex International Problems, Global Accord:
Environmental Challences and International Responses, Nazli
Choucri (ed.), MIT Press, 1993, pp. 453-474.
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transparency of every aspect of the organization that carries
out these functions; a focus of policy; decentralization;
universality; fairness; an emphasis on cooperative rather than
intrusive approaches; a significant role for NGOs; and,
expertise. With these criteria in mind, Victor et. al.
present four (4) options for consideration: 1) strengthen the
UNEP; 2) build the needed expertise out of other arms of the
UN system (see Chapter III Existing Institutions); 3) build
the consortium of governmental and nongovernmental
organizations to perform the needed functions; and, if
absolutely necessary 4) establish a new organization.
Wayne Weiss et. al note that "[t]he choice of an
organization to implement a project and the development of
guidelines and procedures for running the project have often
proven to be critical factors in meeting project
objectives. " 221 Further, "[o] rganizational and managerial
aspects should be analyzed early in the project cycle,
certainly not later -than the time of project formulation, to
permit evaluation of alternative arrangements, and to allow
preparatory steps to begin so that the project will not be
delayed, [and] ... [i]f an existing agency or institution is to
221 Wayne Weiss et. al., The Design of Agricultural and Rural
Development Projects, Planning Development Projects, Dennis
Rodinelli (ed.) Dowden, Strausberg, 1977, pp. 121.
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be used, it must be determined whether reforms or
administrative charges are necessary to increase the chances
of success.222
III. Pre-Convention and Post-Convention Implementation
Activities
In their 1992 article entitled A Prompt Start: Implementing
the Framework Convention on Climate Change, A Report from the
Bellagio Conference on Institutional Aspects of International
Cooperation on Climate Change, Eugene B. Skolnikoff and Abram
Chayes advocate a prompt start towards preparing for
implementation of the FCCC before it entered into force, and
before the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties
("COP") took place.223 Elements of their prompt start
include: 1) a system of reports by the parties on the
strategies, policies and activities they have adopted to
fulfill treaty commitments, to be reviewed internationally;
and 2) transfer to the developing countries of resources and
technology necessary to enable them to do their share. 224
222 Id.
223 Eugene B. Skolnikoff and Abram Chayes, A Prompt Start:
Implementing the Framework Convention on Climate Change, A
Report from the Bellagio Conference on Institutional Aspects
of International Cooperation on Climate Change,1992.
224 Id.
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Several of the most important tasks necessary to ensure a
prompt start to the FCCC include: 1) continued assessment of
scientific, socioeconomic and technological aspects of climate
change; 2) constructing data bases and harmonizing
methodologies; 3) country studies; 4) capacity building; and,
5) preparing for the negotiation of additional protocols
elaborating the Convention, as needed.22 s
Further:
[t]hese start up tasks could be carried out under the aegis
of an ad hoc working group of the designers on the
Convention. The working group would be open ended and
would be supported by a small but effective interim
secretariat. In addition, these bodies could be assigned
responsibility for overseeing the whole process of entry
into force of the Convention to ensure a smooth and
-effective transition. The expenses of these bodies and of
any of the interim activities that are not funded from
national, bilateral or other existing sources, should be
provided according to an agreed schedule of voluntary
contributions from the signatories.226
Start up activities modeled along the lines of those
suggested by Skolnikoff and Chayes concerning the FCCC would
be particularly useful in the case of an international
convention on pesticides. Such a pre-implementation scheme
can work to ensure the overall success of a convention.
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225 Id.
226 Id.
Post-Convention
In addition to the pre-convention review and monitoring
recommendations, and capacity building proposals set forth
above, there are important post-convention assessment
activities critical to effective implementation. The
following attributes identified by Skolnikoff and Chayes as
necessary for the successful implementation of the FCCC, are
also necessary for the effective implementation of the
pesticide convention. These attributes include:
1) transparency; 2) flexibility; 3) decentralization;
4) universality; 5) a significant role for NGOs; and, 6) a
cooperative approach.
IV. Pesticide Subsidies and Aid Programs as Potential
Barriers to Implementation of the Pesticide Convention:
Control of Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Aid and
Subsidy Programs
The beneficiaries of pesticide subsidies in many LDCs are
likely to be a different group from those who bear the costs
and the environmental losses from increased chemical use, both
human poisonings and the destruction of beneficial animal
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species. To the extent that subsidies reach the farmer at
all, their distribution basically conforms to the distribution
of landholdings, which in most countries is highly skewed. 2 2 7
"A great many development activities in every sector of
society, economy, and government [in LDCs] involve the
participation of development assistance agencies. " 228 At the
same time, "both donors and recipients have found it difficult
to provide and make use of aid. " 2 29  Further, "foreign aid
officials attempt to ensure that the resources they control
are committed to activities that in their professional
judgment will contribute positively to economic or social
development and that the resources of committees are likely to
be used with reasonable efficiency and probity and to reach
their intended beneficiaries. " 230  Often, the professional
judgments of foreign aid officials is flawed - having
completed little, if any, research in the country or region in
which the project is to be implemented; projects are often
227 Robert Repetto, Paying the Price: Pesticide Subsidies
in Developing Countries, Research Report #2, World Resources
Institute, December 1985, p. 16.
228 Milton Esman, Interbureaucratic Interdependency in the
Public Sector, Management Dimensions of Development:
Prospectives and Strategies, Kumerian Press, West Hartford,
1991, p. 83.
229 Dennis Rodinelli, Planning and Implementing Development
Projects: An Introduction, Planning Development Projects,
Dennis Rodinelli (ed.) Dowden, Strausberg, 1977, p. 3.
230 Id.
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inappropriate or unimplementable. 2 3 1 What appears as the
"kindness of strangers"232  bearing aid, is, upon close
examination, not kindness at all. Aid agencies such as USAID,
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (A United
Nations specialized agency) and financial institutions like
the WB (which has been accused of caring more about pushing
out loans than about monitoring how well the money is
spent2 3 3 ) have come under severe criticism in recent years
for the failures associated with many development projects.
To address these problems, USAID "is trying to pare down to
just four goals: building democracy; protecting the
environment; fostering sustainable economic development and
encouraging population control. " 2 3 4  How' these vague and
noble goals are actually to be incorporated into the
implementation of development projects is yet to be
determined.
Foreign aid and foreign subsidy program problems range from
ill conceived projects, to poor design (including different
perceptions in the projects objectives and failure of
231 See: Jan K. Black, Donor Strategies and Programs,
Development in Theory and Practice: Bridging the Gap, Westview
Press, Boulder, 1991, pp. 47-80.
232 Why Aid Is An Empty Promise, The Economist, May 7, 1994,
p.19-21.
233 Id., p. 19.
234 Id.
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designers to develop adequate development indicators), poor
management, misappropriation of funds, and corruption2 35 . As
example, with regard to technical assistance, it was reported
that of "the $12 billion or so which goes each year to buy
advice, training and project design [in LDCs], over 90% is
spent on foreign consultants. [And], half of all technical
assistance goes to Africa - which 'has perhaps received more
bad advice per capita than any other continent. ' " 23 6  More
importantly, "the richest 40% of the developing world gets
twice as much [aid] per head as the poorest 40%. Big military
spenders get [much more ] per head as do the less belligerent.
EL Salvador, [for example], gets five times as much aid as
235 Dennis Rodinelli, Planning and Implementing Development
Projects: An Introduction, Planning Development Projects,
Dennis Rodinelli (ed.) Dowden, Strausberg, 1977, p. 4.
According to Rodinelli, differences in perception of project
goals and purposes arise from or result in, among other
things: 1) failure of international assistance agencies to
involve host government agencies in planning and formulation
of the project, resulting in a lack of indigenous support and
commitment to the project after approval; 2) unrealistic goal
and purpose definition in relations to available time and
resources to complete the project; 3) failure in design to
distinguish between the objectives, activities, inputs, and
outputs of a project or to distinguish between those of a
discrete project and the goals, activities, and outputs of the
sponsoring institution; and, 4) inaccurate assessment of needs
or identification of needs for goods and services for which
there is no effective demand, resulting in outputs for which
there is no existing or expandable market.
236 Id., p. 20. See also: David D. Gow, Collaboration in
Development Consulting: Stooges, Hired Guns, or Musketeers?,
Human Organizations, Vol. 50. No. 1, pp. 1-15; John M. Cohen,
Foreign Advisors and Capacity Building: The Case of Kenya,
Public Administration and Development, Vol. 12, pp. 493-510,
1992.
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Bangladesh, even though Bangladesh has 24 times as many people
and is five times poorer than El Salvador. ,237
Governments in developing countries use subsidies
(discussed more fully in Chapter VI) to promote greater use of
pesticides on crops grown for export to the developed world.
These subsidies reduce the cost of pesticides to the farmer by
twenty to eighty percent. They take the form of direct sales
at prices below cost, assess to foreign exchange on favorable
terms, preferential tax treatment, low-interest loans which
are subsequently forgiven, or any combination thereof.
Repetto, for example, notes "in Senegal, 51 percent of
agricultural pesticides are used on cotton, which together
with pesticides and sugarcane accounts for two-thirds of the
total market."2 39 Further, "[t]hese are not staple crops of
the poor, and, to a large extent, they are grown for export.
Therefore, any favorable effects of greater pesticide use of
crop yields would not benefit low-income consumers, but
predominately the owners of large commercial farms." 24
Often, pesticides tied to subsidies are obsolete, banned or
canceled in country of export. Many LDCs, in need of
237 Id., p. 19.
238 Baender, note 20 supra, p. 565, citing Robert Reppeto,
Paying The Price: Pesticide Subsidies in Developing Countries,
World Resources Institute, Vol. 2, 1985, pp. 1 & 5.
239 Repetto, note 227 supra, p. 16.
240 Id.
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financial assistance accept the pesticides and then stockpile
them. This creates hazardous waste disposal problems in
addition to the human health and environment risk these
pesticides pose.
Repetto believes that reducing pesticide subsidies would
probable reduce a source of inequity, as well as economic
losses and environmental damages. 2 4 ' But governments in many
LDCs are reluctant to eliminate pesticide subsidies because of
their strong ties to foreign assistance and their importance
in LDCs agricultural export markets. In a 1988 study it was
reported that of nine developing countries examined, the
average national government subsidy for pesticide sales
amounted to 44% of the final price.242 And, "in Mexico,
Indonesia, Brazil, India, China, and in much of Africa,
pesticide subsidies are based on the assumption that increased
pesticide use is necessary, not only to increase food
production and hard currency-earning exports, but also to
transform agriculture and foster industrialization. " 2 43
Repetto states that this assumption is incorrect. In his
view, reducing pesticide subsidies would reduce fiscal burdens
on government . 2 4 4  "The substantial amounts [of government
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
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budgets] devoted to pesticide subsidies might otherwise be
spent on extension programs to inform farmers about pesticide
safety and IPM techniques; on research programs to develop
biological controls and better plant protection methods for
important crop; on pest monitoring networks; and on better
enforcement of existing pesticide regulations. " 245
An international agreement on pesticides can only be
effective if the current subsidy system which encourages
pesticide use is overhauled. Some governments have turned
pesticide subsidy programs on their heads and now use them to
encourage farmers to engage in organic farming, or to use
integrated pest management. In Denmark, for example, the
government has instituted a program that provides financial
support to farmers during their conversion to organic farming,
and the EC has also initiated a conversion grant program to
encourage organic farming.2" In the United States, the 1990
Farm Bill provides financial incentives for farmers to
implement production methods that protect water supplies from
contamination.247  Unfortunately, the same institutional
infrastructures, training, and monitoring capacities does not
245 Id.
246 Baender, note 20, supra, p. 573, citing, Linda Starke,
Signs of Hope, Working Towards Our Common Future, 1990, p. 57.
247 Id., p. 574, citing The Food, Agriculture, Conservation,
and Trade Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359.
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exist in many LDCs.
The proposed convention on pesticides should expressly
prohibit DCs, multilateral, bilateral, and foreign assistance
agencies (including USAID, WHO and FAO) from granting
pesticide subsidies to LDCs, if they have any connection to
banned or canceled pesticides. Additionally, the inclusion of
alternative, safe, pest management programs and policies
should be one of the criteria in reviewing aid projects.
V. LDC and DC Implementation Roles and Responsibilities
in Addressing the Pesticide Problem
The pesticide convention will only be effective if LDCs
take on their share of the responsibility for its
implementation. Such responsibility includes: 1) the
enactment of stringent pesticide regulations which prohibit
the import of banned and canceled pesticides, and which
prohibit the manufacture of similarly dangerous pesticides on
a national level; 2) a commitment to prohibit foreign
pesticide subsidies if such pesticides are banned, canceled,
or obsolete, and a commitment to overhaul current government
pesticide subsidy systems to prohibit payments for other
dangerous pesticide or practices; 3) grant payments for use of
IPM, organic farming, or other more safe pest control
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technologies via the financial mechanism(s) established under
the proposed convention; 4) a commitment to funding and
capacity building, including the establishment of a monitoring
system, education and training; 5) a commitment to ensure that
pesticides, including obsolete pesticides, are properly
managed and disposed of when determined to be wastes.
DCs have key responsibilities in ensuring the
implementation of the convention as well. Foremost, there
must be a commitment to the convention's goals. Effective
implementation requires that DCs, among other things, provide
the financial mechanisms and technical assistance for the
change to non-chemical or safer pest management programs.
Other DC roles and responsibilities are discussed in Chapter
IV.
VI. NGOs and IGOs Role in Implementation
NGOs will play important roles in implementation of the
proposed pesticide convention. Many NGOs have great
technical capacity, and may be of assistance in operating
farmer training programs in LDCs. They could also assist in
compiling and reviewing. data (including assessing data
integrity) submitted under the monitoring requirements of the
convention.
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Many existing institutions or IGOs have the experience and
capacity to assist in the implementation of the convention.
For example, UNEP can act as a data collection and monitoring
agency rather than creating a new body to oversee the
convention' s implementation.2 48
Specific examples and recommendations of the role of NGOs
and IGOs in the pesticide convention are discussed more fully
in Chapter III.
VII. Verification, Monitoring, Enforcement, and Compliance
In most existing bilateral and multilateral international
agreements concerning the environment, "monitoring and
enforcement provisions probably provide more opportunities for
contention than any single aspect of international treaty
negotiation" .249
The past 20 years have seen the production of hundreds of
international conventions, agendas, action plans, and
declarations addressing a vast range of environmental and
developmental issues. Yet there appears to be a
disparity between the legal and political commitments
made at the international level and the fulfillment of
those obligations where they really matter. While the
body of international environmental norms has grown, the
development of the means to ensure that these commitments
248 Baender, note 20 supra, p. 604.
249 Lawrence Susskind, note 188 supra.
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are fully and effectively implemented has generally been
overlooked.250
S. Jacob Scherr et al. reference a 1992 GAO report on the
implementation of environmental agreements. "The survey,
which examined eight major environmental conventions, found
that it was impossible to determine what countries had done to
implement the treaties since they had failed to provide
required national reports."25'
1. Advancing Compliance: Traditional and Non-traditional
Approaches
If an international agreement prohibiting the export of
banned or canceled pesticides is formulated, what mechanisms
are necessary to ensure compliance? Three types of behavior
have been identified as the root cause of noncompliance with
treaty obligations: 1) ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty
language, 2) limitation on the capacity of parties to carry
out their undertaking, and 3) the temporal dimension of the
social, economic, and political changes contemplated by
25 Emil Salim, note 214 supra, p, 236.
251 Id., p. 236, quoting General Accounting Office (January
1992) International Environmental Agreements Are Not Well
Monitored, GAO/RCED-92-43.
117
regulatory treaties.2 s2 It is not willfulness, in most
instances, that causes noncompliance, but lack of capacity or
clarity or priority.2 s3 It is patently clear that many of
the existing international agreements on environment are
ineffective in obtaining compliance.
2. An expansion of the Traditional: Producer Pays, Take Back
Provisions, Penalties, and Damages
This proposal for an international convention on pesticides
advocates the inclusion of stringent take back (exporter pays
entire costs for return of pesticide to point of export) ,254
and penalty provisions for exporters and governments who
violate the convention by exporting those pesticides and
pesticide chemicals prohibited under the convention. Further,
the convention should include provisions which allow for the
award of compensation, and punitive damages for personal
injury and other losses which result for the export of
illegal pesticides in the country of export. To be effective,
such a provision should also require that the parties to the
convention enact legislation in their jurisdiction which
252 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, Chapter
1: A Theory of Compliance (forthcoming 1995).
253 Id.
254 Bill Barclay and John Steggall, Obsolete Pesticides Crisis,
Global Pesticide Campaigner, February 1992.
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allows such claims for international harm. Clearly, such a
provision will lead to protest from many fronts, including
chemical manufacturers, and even some LDCs. However, such a
provision is critical to the effective implementation of the
proposed convention.
3. A Non-Traditional Approach: A Temporal and Fluid
Compliance System
Under an international agreement which prohibits the trade
of banned pesticides, compliance does not mean that simply
trade in these pesticides is prohibited. Under such an
interpretation, black markets would immediately form to meet
the demands of LDCs for pesticides. Therefore, compliance
under the proposed convention must be two pronged: 1) strict
and swift compliance on the part of exporting nations; and 2)
temporal compliance on the part of LDCs. This is needed to
reflect the reality that some phase-down/ phase-out period is
required for LDCs to be provided with properly registered
alternate pest management systems or pesticide substitutes.
The compliance structure for LDCS must be temporal, and what
is an acceptable level of compliance will vary in the short
run for different countries or regions, based on their
infrastructure, the availability of substitutes, technology
transfers, and training.
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This does not mean the system advocated should be one of
"compliance without enforcement". 2 ss Chayes and Chayes note
that "'an acceptable level of compliance' is not an invariant
standard. It changes over time with the capacities of the
parties and the urgency of the problem. It may depend on the
type of treaty, the context, the exact behavior involved. 25 6
4. Chayes Managerial Model
Chayes and Chayes argue in their forthcoming book that
parties to international treaties have a propensity to comply
with the requirements of the treaty. This propensity stems
from considerations of the following factors:
1) Efficiency - from an economic standpoint point, it is
less expensive or easier to comply than not; and, in
bureaucratic organizations, compliance is the normal
organizational presumption.
2) Interests - the assumption is that the international
negotiation of treaties includes consideration of the
interests of the parties. Thus, as an instrument
which represents their interests or BATNA, parties
have no reason not to comply.
3) Norms - As treaties are acknowledged to be legally
binding on the parties to it, the existence of a legal
obligation for most actors in most situations,
255 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, Compliance Without
Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties,
Negotiation Journal, Vol. 7, p. 311 (1991).
256 Id.
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translates into a presumption of compliance, in the
absence of countervailing circumstance.257
To ensure the effectiveness of the proposed convention,
there should be a shift from the more traditional system of
coercive strategies (sanctions, for example) to more
collaborative or cooperative strategies.2 ss A system of
active management which includes: 1) capacity building, 2)
dispute settlement, and 3) adaptation and modification of
treaty norms is warranted.2 1
VIII. Capacity Building, Technical Assistance, and Funding
A Pesticide GEF
The successful implementation of a convention to prohibit
the export of banned and canceled pesticides is most dependent
on a organized and implementable system which includes
technology transfers (i.e. organic farming or IPM), training,
and most important funding. A financial institution similar to
the Global Environmental Facility ("GEF") (similar to funding
257 Id. For a more detailed discussion of the Chayes
Managerial Model, see forthcoming book.
258 See: Malcolm Sparrow, Imposing Duties: Government's
Changing Approach to Compliance, Westport, CN, Praeger, 1994.
259 Chayes and Chayes, note 252 supra, Chapter 9; See also:
Malcolm Sparrow, Imposing Duties: Government's Changing
Approach to Compliance, Westport, CN, Praeger, 1994.
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mechanisms in the Montreal Protocol, the Framework Convention
for Climate Change ("FCCC") , and Biodiversity Convention) is
necessary. A structure similar to that of GEF II, wherein
LDCs have more decision making authority, but where the
expertise of the World Bank... is used, is advocated. The
fund would be financed by a number of sources, including UNEP.
However, member DC nations should be required to fund based on
a formula which is connected to their rate of pesticide
exports (including past exports of banned and canceled
pesticides).
The fund should be used to finance infrastructure building
(including financial, legal, and technical assistance in
formulating stringent domestic pesticide regulations,
monitoring and enforcement programs), training for LDCs in
new, more environmentally safe pest management agricultural
techniques, and other uses determined to further the purpose
of the convention.
IX. Timetables and Targets
210 Interestingly, the World Bank has established pesticide
guidelines to use in making decisions involving pesticides in
LDCs. Unfortunately, the policy has not been followed. By
creation of a pesticide GEF, where the decision-making
authority lies with the parties (particularly, LDCs) the
problem of the World Bank failing to adhere to its pesticide
policy is solved.
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The convention to prohibit the export of banned and
canceled pesticides must be implemented on a stratified
schedule which depends on the current infrastructure and
capacity of a particular LDC. This is not, as exists in the
Montreal Protocol, an extension of time for LDCs to comply
with the convention. It is a proposal for a contingent
compliance schedule based on the availability of substitutes,
training and educational requirements, and stringent reporting
mechanisms designed to document the phase out of these
pesticides.
The Danish pesticide program provides a good model for the
phase-out from usage of banned and canceled pesticides, in
both LDCs and DCs. "Danish pesticide use dropped by 18% in
1991, the largest annual reduction in usage since [its]
national crop protection plan started in 1986. The plan aims
to halve pesticide usage by 1997.26 Similar plans and
results have been reported in Sweden.26
X. Dispute Resolution
Under the FAO, recourse has never been had to the
261 Pesticide Action Network, World Agrochemical Sales Fall,
PANNA, April 21, 1993.
262 Id.
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International Court of Justice ("ICJ") or an arbitral
tribunal. Disputes and questions of interpretation involving
the Constitution or Conventions adopted under Article XIV of
the Constitution are usually referred to the Committee on the
Constitution and Legal Matters.2 3 It is recommended that
dispute resolution language similar to the contained in the
FCCC be adopted in the proposed pesticide convention.
XI. The Pesticide Convention and GATT Question
There currently exists many international environmental
agreements which have trade provisions. These include, among
others, the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna
and Flora in Their Natural State, 1933; the Convention on
Nature Preservation and Wildlife Preservation in the Western
Hemisphere, 1940; Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973; the
International Convention for the Protection of Birds, 1950;
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, 1987; the International Plant Protection Agreement,
1951; the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1989; and the
263 Id, citing J.F. MacMahon & Michael Akehurst, Settlement of
Disputes in Special Fields, p. 229.
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ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources. Agenda 21 from the Rio Summit (Part A, Chapter 2)
requires that the international community ensure that
environmental and trade policies are mutually supportive, with
a view to achieving sustainable development. However,
environmental and trade policies are often viewed as mutually
exclusive. Any convention to prohibit the export of banned
and canceled pesticides must also include stringent trade
provisions. Arguments that such trade restrictions violate
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 "1 should easily
be defeated, even though GATT has no express provisions
specifically geared to protecting the environment. First, it
is generally agreed that international treaties take
precedence over executive agreements, such as GATT.6Z
Second, in Article XX(b) and (g) under the "General
Exceptions" section of GATT it states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction international trade, nothing in
264 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947,
61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, as amended (hereafter GATT).
265 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937), cited
in Steve Charnovitz,, The Environment Vs. Trade Rules:
Defogging the Debate, Environmental Law, Vol. 23, 1993, p.
507. Charnovitz points out that certain executive agreements
have been determined to have the weight of international
treaties in questions concerning inconsistent state law.
125
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption
or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restriction on domestic production or
consumption.
Pesticides are banned and canceled mainly because the
potential for unreasonable adverse harm which results from
their use (and misuse) does not outweigh their utility. And,
in most cases, there are readily available substitutes, so
continued use of the offending pesticide is not warranted. As
the justification for the proposed convention is to protect
humans and the environment from the adverse impacts of
pesticide use, the general exception of Article XX (b) and (g)
apply.
Certain "slippery slope" problems with Article XX (b) and
(g) exceptions for environmental issues have been raised.
First, environment is not expressly mentioned in either
Article XX (b) or (g). This is perhaps the weakest argument
that GATT does not allow trade restrictions based on
environmental considerations because most have interpreted
these sections to specifically pertain to the environment.
But " [t]wo interpretative questions in particular stand out,
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namely the interpretation of the word 'necessary,' and the
question of whose health, or which exhaustible resources can
be the object of an acceptable national government
regulation.2" The significance of these interpretative
problems are downplayed in the proposed pesticide convention.
A decision to ban or cancel a pesticide based on health or
environmental reasons is a per se determination that such
action is "necessary" to protect human health and the
environment. Although the decision is made nationally, the
same necessity applies extraterritorially. And, as the
decision is made at the national level, export bans are
therefore "measures made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption."
The decision to prohibit the manufacture and distribution
of hazardous pesticides domestically is arguably the
establishment of a product standard - certain chemicals or
chemical ingredients are prohibited from being marketed and
distributed by manufacturers. According to Steve Charnovitz,
"product standards are regulations on domestic sales or
transportation that apply to goods pari passu in international
266 John J. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental
Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, Washington & Lee Law
Review, Vol. 49, 1992, p. 1127.
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trade". 26 7  Further, "[t]his type of trade measure can be
consistent with GATT if it meets the national treatment
requirement of Article 111:4 and is not viewed as affording
protection to domestic production in contravention of Article
III:1. Such a trade measure must also meet the [Most Favored
Nation] requirement of Article I:1" .268
The prohibition on trade in canceled and banned pesticides
and pesticide chemicals is supported under Article XX(b) and
(g), provided that any export restrictions are justified on
ecological grounds and are openly announced, and are not
'disguised' restrictions on trade. As long as the
restrictions must apply equally to exports, there should not
be sustainable arguments that the restriction(s) are
discriminatory.
Interestingly, the EC has taken a different position
regrading environment than under GATT. Although Article 30 of
the EC Treaty guarantees the free movement of trade by
prohibiting member states from imposing import quotas, Article
36 includes provisions which allow for trade restrictions in
the following circumstances:1) public morality; 2) the
267 Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules:
Defogging the Debate, Environmental Law, Vol. 23, 1993, p.
490.
268 Id.
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protection of health and life of humans, animals, and plants;
3) the protection of national treasures possessing artistic,
historic, or archaeological value; and, 4) the protection of
industrial and commercial property.26 9 "Provided, therefore,
that a member State can show that its trading rule is intended
to further one of these four objectives, it will not be struck
down as contrary to Article 30. "270
The Court, however, has interpreted these exceptions
restrictively. It has, for example, refused to accept that
the expression 'public policy' includes the protection of
consumers. By the same token, environmental protection
measures to prevent waste, or to reduce discharges into the
air or water, will not be considered as protecting the life
of humans, animals or plants, They would, therefore, fall
outside the exceptions listed in Article 36. In fact
provision for environmental protection in Article 36 is
conspicuous in its absence.27'
In practice, "this omission has been remedied". 2 For
example, in both the Cassio de Dijon case and the Danish
Bottles Case, the ECJ determined in the Commission vs. Denmark
that so-called 'mandatory requirements' such as Denmark's
requirement that beer and soft drink could only be marketed in
returnable, re-useable containers were appropriate trade
269 Marina Wheeler, Greening the EEC Treaty, in Greening
International Law, Phillippe Sands (ed.), The New Press, New
York, 1994, p. 89.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
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restrictions under Article 36. In the Denmark case, the ECJ
ruled that in the absence of specific EC environmental
legislation establishing a rule of environmental protection,
it will permit national environmental rules to restrict trade
between member states provided that: 1) the rules are
genuinely intended to protect the environment; 2) the effect
on trade is not disproportionate to the objective pursued; and
3) the rules are not discriminatory against producers in third
273
countries.
The ECJ decisions on environment are, of course, different
than those of the GATT panel. In one famous GATT panel
decision, the Mexican Tuna/Dolphin case, Mexico challenged the
United States Marine Mammal Protection Act, Section 102 (a) (2)
which resulted in import restriction on tuna from Mexico to
the United States. The GATT panel ruled against the so-called
trade restriction based on environmental considerations. "The
panel ruled that a party was not entitled to restrict imports
so as to 'equalize conditions under which a product is
produced' domestically and abroad. It also rules that the ban
amounted to a 'quantitative restriction' which could not be
justified under either GATT exception: the measure could not
be said to safeguard life or health of humans or plants
130
273 Id. pp. 89-90.
'within the jurisdiction of the importing country.'
Interpreting Article XX(g) [of GATT] , the panel made it clear
that trade restrictions could only be enforced to further
domestic conservation policies and not those of third
countries. "274
The Dunkel Draft from the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations has attempted to reach harmonization with regard
to certain environmental issues. 2 75  For example, it states
that harmonization should be reached in pesticide residue
levels and other health standards found in environmental law.
This draft is still in negotiation, and the debate between
trade and environment is expected to continue for some time to
come.
Ian Goldin and Odin Knudsen remark that "developing
countries will be among the most seriously affected -
positively or negatively - by the outcome of the GATT
274 Id., p. 90. See: GATT-- United States--Restriction on
Imports of Tuna, --Report of the Panel, DS 21/R, 3 September
1991; Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th
Cir. 1991) ; Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp.
826 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Bob Davis, U.S., Mexico, Venezuela Reach
Accord to Protect Dolphins From Tuna Nets, The Wall Street
Journal, March 20, 1992.
275 James Cameron, The GATT and the Environment, in Greening
International Law, Phillippe Sands (ed.), The New Press, New
York 1994, p. 114.
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negotiations on agricultural trade liberalization. "276  This
is because "in developing countries, agriculture is generally
much more important as a source of income and employment than
is the case in the industrialized economies. Developing
countries, because of their relatively large dependence on,
agriculture, their reliance on agricultural trade and, for
many, because of their high dependence on food imports, will
be influenced by any outcome of the Uruguay Round
negotiations .277
There are other issues which will have to be addressed in
the negotiations over the pesticide convention in relation to
trade. One strong argument which is often used by defenders
of environment under GATT is that "[its] substantive rules,
which predate the emergence of the environment as a critical
issue, are too narrowly focused on the commercial benefits of
trade facilitation and must be updated to reflect
environmental considerations. "2 78  Interestingly, in the
Report of the First Meeting of the Policy Dialogue on Trade
and Environment in Taillories France in September 1994, it was
276 Ian Goldin and Odin Knudsen, Agricultural Trade
Liberalization: Implications for Developing Countries, OECD,
1990, p. 475.
277 Id.
278 Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and
the Future, Institute for International Economics, July 1994,
p. 53.
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stated that the participants (officials and others concerned
with the intersection in international trade and environmental
policy) "are at one in the belief, as affirmed in the Uruguay
Round agreements, that there is no inherent contradiction
between the objectives of a free, non-discriminatory
multilateral trading system and sound policies for protecting
the environment and achieving sustainable development." 2 7 9
Hopefully, this belief will translate into implementable
policies aimed at resolving the current debate on trade and
environment. Clearly, the complexities of the
trade/environment debate are beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, this debate should not become a barrier to the
negotiation of an international agreement on pesticides.
With existing institutions and trade, implementation is
also a persistent problem. In the case of the Food and
Agricultural Organization's Prior Informed Consent ("PIC")
program, for example, a report released in January 1995 by
The Pesticides Trust in the United Kingdom disclosed that
corporate strategies seeking to expand markets for pesticides
and the increasing export of agricultural produce from LDCs
are leading to an increase in pesticide use in these
279 Report, The Policy Dialogue on Trade and Environment,
Report of the First Meeting, Tailloires, France, September 29-
20, 1994, p.2.
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countries, 280 and, more importantly it found that "in spite
of specific actions to address pesticide problems, like the
PIC procedure, problems persist and conditions of use in most
developing countries are largely unchanged. ",21 The report
examined the PIC system in five countries through case studies
(Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines, Paraguay, and Senegal).
They illustrated "continuing health and environmental
problems associated with pesticide use in [LDCs] as well as
problems related to government regulation of pesticides". 28 2
" [I]n Paraguay and Senegal, their governments have formally
indicated a willingness to participate in the PIC process, but
internal conflicts have effectively blocked implementation of
the procedure. " 28 3  Further, "the Indonesia case study
demonstrated that pesticide use can be reduced with successful
farmer training techniques to promote integrated pest
management ("1IPM" ) but that in spite of this, the market for
pesticides in that country continues to grow. " 28 4
Additionally, the report noted that:
280 Pesticide Action Network, Report Shows Trade Controls
Inadequate in Reducing Pesticide Hazards in Developing
Countries, PANNA, January 19, 1995, citing, The Pesticide
Trust, The Pesticide Trail: The Impact of Trade Controls on
Reducing Pesticide Hazards in Developing Countries, January
1995.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
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[although] there has been some shifting away from use of
the more environmentally persistent organochlorine
pesticides, overall pesticide use in [LDCs] is increasing.
The country studies also make clear that the WHO class I (a)
(extremely hazardous) , I (b) (highly hazardous) and II
(moderately hazardous), and in particular organophosphate
and carbamates, are in regular and routine use in [LDCs].
Importantly: the report makes a number of recommendations to
improve the effectiveness of the PIC procedure, These
include:
1) making PIC a legally binding instrument;
2) banning the export of pesticides banned in the country
of production;
3) speeding procedures to include additional pesticides
in PIC;
4) providing more training workshops for both government
officials and NGOs;
5) requiring that governments allow access to trade
information to ensure that PIC is meeting its intended
objectives;
6) requiring that governments participating in PIC
disclose additional information that comes to their
notice on the potentially harmful effects of
pesticides;
135
7) providing importing governments with on information
non-chemical alternatives to hazardous chemicals; and,
8) providing technical assistance both to developing
regulatory capacity and to promote sustainable
agriculture based on non-chemical alternatives.2 s
XII. Is There Room for Joint Implementation in the Pesticide
Convention
Joint implementation, as expressed in discussions
concerning climate change and global greenhouse gas emissions,
is perhaps more immediately applicable and implementable in an
international treaty to prohibit the export of banned and
canceled pesticides. Joint implementation is generally
broadly defined as an attempt to reduce the global costs of
achieving global greenhouse emission abatement. "The
principle underlying joint implementation ("JI") , therefore is
that of 'global cost-effectiveness." 2 ". In a modified form,
it appears to offer some utility in the pesticide convention.
For example, certain DCs pesticide manufacturers which have
a history of export to specific LDCs could institute so-called
"side-agreements" between themselves regarding the transfer of
285 Id.
286 Tom Jones, Operational Criteria for Joint Implementation,
OECD, 1993, p. 2.
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funding, technology, and other resources, in exchange for the
continuation of a particular market representation. Other
recommendations are certain to follow as the negotiations get
underway.
XIII. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that implementation is no
easy task. The failure to implement is the key reason most
international environment agreements are not effective.
Implementation solutions are complex, costly, and resource
intensive. Therefore, it is imperative that the parties to
the convention express not only a commitment to achieve its
goals, but also agree to provide the resources to ensure its
successful implementation.
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CHAPTER VI - A Phased Approach to Success In the Pesticide
Convention: Pesticide Regulation Coupled with Sustainable
Agricultural Pest Management Scheme
I. Introduction
Three general objectives should drive the proposed
convention. First, it should expressly prohibit the trade in
pesticides and pesticide chemicals which have been banned or
canceled in the country of production for human health and
environmental reasons. Second, and more difficult, it should
seek to harmonize the definition of pesticides and establish
an international regulatory system for those pesticides which
are not banned or canceled. This will require that parties
who ratify the convention amend and/or create national and
local regulatory schemes which are consistent with the
international structure. Further, the regulatory system must
include notification, monitoring and data collection
provisions for the export/import of pesticides to ensure that
parties receive accurate, up to date, human health and
environmental data on pesticides, and proper use, storage and
disposal instructions. Third, the convention should include
provisions to implement alternative, safe, pest management
practices, which incorporate existing and evolving sustainable
agricultural practices.
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This chapter presents an initial exploration of how the
first two objectives can be meet. It then goes on to provide
detailed information about the intersection between pesticides
and sustainable agriculture to conclude that the long term
success of the convention is dependent on the implementation
of pest management programs and policies which incorporate
sustainable agricultural programs.
II. An International Pesticide Regulatory System
The international regulation of pesticides through the
convention is the most difficult objective. The convention's
first order of business should be the development of
provisions and/or annexes (which are subject to amendment27 )
which prioritize pesticides based on three broad categories:
1) banned and canceled; 2) hazardous pesticides which are not
banned or canceled, but whose use must be monitored; and 3)
pesticide tolerances in food and products identified by the
parties. These three components are explored below:
287This thesis advocates the use of provisions similar to
those contained in Article 10 of the Montreal Protocol, Adoption
and Amendment of Annexes, and Article of the FCCC. For example,
Article 10 of the Montreal Protocol states in pertinent part,
that annexes to the Protocol shall form an integral part of the
Convention; that annexes shall be proposed and adopted according
to procedures set forth in Article 9, Amendment of the Convention
or Protocols, Sections 2 and 3,includes provisions for their
circulation to the parties and the terms for their entry into
force, etc.
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1) An "A" list, negotiated by the parties, should be
developed which lists those pesticides and pesticide chemicals
banned or canceled in one or more party nations, and which the
parties have agreed should be expressly prohibited from
import/export under the convention. A penalty scheme and
specific trade sanctions for trade between parties and non-
parties must be included in the convention to deter and
penalize party and non-party nations from illegal trade in
banned pesticides, and to deter the transfer of the
technologies to produce these pesticides. (See Chapter V for
discussion of the proposed convention and GATT).
2) A "B" list of pesticides which includes those which are
not banned or canceled, but whose use should be monitored
based on scientific data which discloses potential long-term
adverse impacts; this embodies the application of the
precautionary principle. This will require that the parties
submit data and written notification to a designated
monitoring institution (either newly created under the
convention, or a modified institution under existing
institutions such as the UNEP/FAO or Codex system) (See
Chapter III), outlining the results of scientific studies
conducted on these pesticides, among other information.
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3) A "C" list which contains pesticide residue limitations
for food and other products, as agreed by the parties.
This is only a skeleton of how the parties to the pesticide
convention should package negotiations concerning the
establishment of an international regulatory scheme for
pesticide. Clearly, these discussions will be the most
difficult, as they hit on issues concerning the sovereign
rights of party-nations to develop their own environmental
rules and regulations. Much of the debate regarding
sovereignty may be overcome by the creation of incentives for
all parties to participate in such a system. Of course, an
unusual incentive might be the desire for harmonization of
regulations that may displace trade barriers based on more
stringent and legitimate environmental regulations under
Article XX (b) and (g) of GATT. On the other hand,
harmonization of a regulatory scheme can create new markets
and new products for trade, and promote the transfer of new
technology.
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III. The Goal of Pest Management and Sustainable Agriculture:
A Key Component of the Convention
A. What is Sustainable Agriculture
This section of this chapter includes a detailed discussion
on sustainable agriculture and pesticides. Unlike the
proposed establishment of an international regulatory system
for pesticides which is "muddy", will be hotly debated, and
will take significant amounts of time and resources to create,
there currently exists proven sustainable agricultural
practices which can be implemented under the proposed
convention. The transition to safe, alternative, pest
management which is based on sustainable agricultural
practices will provide, in this thesis' view, the greatest
long-term benefit under the convention. In other words, if
current practices and philosophy regarding heavy reliance on
chemical pesticides (in both LDCs and DCs) can be changed
through education in sustainable agricultural practices, then
the objectives of the convention can be meet that much sooner,
i.e., to abate the adverse human health and environmental
impacts of chemical pesticide uses and abuses in the world.
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sustainable agriculture
determining what activities constitute sustainable agriculture
- and how they should be achieved or implemented is
controversial. 2 "8 It is broadly defined as maintaining
productivity and farm profitability while minimizing
environmental impacts. In 1988, the FAO developed the
following definition for sustainable development as relates to
agriculture:
The management and conservation of the natural resource
base, and the orientation of technological and
institutional change in such a manner as to ensure the
attainment and continued satisfaction of human needs for
present and future generations. Such sustainable
development (in the agricultural, forestry, and fisheries
sectors) conserves land, water, plant and animal genetic
resources, is environmentally non-degrading, technically
288 See: Timothy O'Riordan, The Politics of Sustainability,
Sustainable Environmental Management, Westview Press, 1988,
pp. 29-50; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Wasn't the Future Wonderful?
Resources, Environment, and the Emerging Myth of Global
Sustainable Development, Colorado Journal of International
Environmental Law and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 35, 1991, pp. 35-54;
Anil Markandya et. al. Sustainable Agriculture: A Background
Paper, prepared for the First International Program on the
Management of Sustainability, Sustainability Foundation, June
1994, p. 1. Further, at a 1993 conference on Integrated
Resource Management for Sustainable Agriculture in China, many
of the presenters focused on China's need to maintain or
increase reliance on chemical fertilizers and certain forms of
chemical pest management, and much of the discussion centered
on the technical, social, and political obstacles which must
be overcome in order to promote sustainable agriculture. See:
Pesticide Action Network, Sustainable Agriculture Conference
in China, PANNA, October 12, 1993.
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is problematicDef ining
appropriate, economically viable and socially
acceptable.289
It "requires some assessment of what technologies will be
available in the future, how the productivity of the land
will respond to these technologies, and how the population
of that community will grow and divide itself between urban
and agricultural activities." 290
In LDCs, the concept of sustainable agriculture entails:
1) meeting the basic nutritional requirements for the
agricultural and rural sectors; 2) providing durable
employment, sufficient incomes and decent working and living
conditions for rural people; 3) maintaining the productive
capacity of the natural resource base, while protecting the
environment; and, 4) reducing the vulnerability of the
289 Anil Markandya et. al, Sustainable Agriculture: A
Background Paper, prepared for the First International Program
on the Management of Sustainability, Sustainability
Foundation, June 1994, pp. 2-3,
290 Id., p. 1; See also: Lee A Kimball, note 147 supra; Paul
Faeth, (ed.) Agricultural Policy and Sustainability: Case
Studies from India, Chile, the Philippines and the United
States, World Resources Institute, September 1993, p.2, citing
World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987. Here
sustainability is broadly defined as that economic activity
which should meet current needs without impinging on future
options: the resources needed in the future must not be
depleted to satisfy today's consumption. See further: Robert
Solow, Sustainability: An Economist's Perspective, National
Geographic Research and Exploration, Vol. 8, No. 1., 1992, pp.
3-6.
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agricultural sector to adverse natural and socio-economic
factors and other risks, and strengthening self-
reliance. ,291
Sustainable agriculture is a specific subset of
sustainable development. Sustainable development, a topic
of heated debate in recent time, is also difficult to
define.29 2 "The United Nations Commission on Environment
and Development defines sustainable development as
'development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs.'"29 3 Interestingly, the November 1994 Draft
International Covenant on Environment and Development294
does not expressly define sustainable development. It is
generally viewed as the simultaneous measure of economic
activity and environmental consequences of the activity,
instead of relying solely on unidimensional measures such as
291 P.A. Yotopoulos and W. Keddeman, Issues and Perspectives
in Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development, in Markandya
et. al., note 272, supra, p. 18.
292 Lawrence Susskind, Sustainability: An Introduction,
prepared for the First International Program on the Management
of Sustainability, Sustainability Foundation, June 1994, pp.
1-9.
293 Id., p. 1, citing United Nations Commission on Environment
and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1987, p. 43.
294 IUCN Commission on Environmental Law, Draft International
Covenant on Environment and Development, November 1994.
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per capita gross domestic product.29 s
Long-term use of pesticides is simply unsustainable.29 6
Discussions regarding sustainable agriculture must therefore
include reassessment of pesticide policies and practices,
integrated pest management (as well as other alternatives to
chemical pesticides), more stringent pesticide manufacture
and use regulations and policies which are based on human
health and environmental considerations. Markandya et. al.
note that sustainable development in agriculture can be
approached in one of two ways: 1) a "bottom up" approach;
and 2) a "top down" approach.2 " In the "bottom up"
approach, "indicators of resource pressure are measured and
reported at the local level, and an evaluation made of their
implications in the short to medium term. Among the
indicators that should be looked at are: rates of
deforestation, rates of loss of top soil, agricultural
yields, agricultural productivity adjusted for changes in
external inputs, and output per person (in physical and
295 William R. Moomaw, Sustainable Industrialization:
Identifying the Factors, prepared for the First International
Program on the Management of Sustainability, Sustainability
Foundation, June 1994, p.6.
296 Agnes Rola and Prabhu Pingali, Pesticides, Rice
Productivity and Health Impacts in the Philippines, in
Agricultural Policy and Sustainability: Case Studies from
India, Chile, the Philippines and the United States, Paul
Faeth (ed.), World Resources Institute, September 1993, p. 47.
297 Markandya, note 289 supra, pp. 2-6.
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value terms) .,298 The "top down" approach "involves
estimating national indicators of sustainability. If a
country is investing enough from its current input, both in
physical capital as well as research and development, its
productive capacity will grow at a pace that will permit
real incomes to be maintained even if the populations is
growing."299 Markandya et. al. also outline a framework
for sustainable agriculture through the following policy
objectives:
1) encourage efficiency in the use of resources, so
that the maximum output is obtained from a given
input of man made and natural resources;
2) promote equity, at least to the extent of
eliminating the extreme poverty that results in, and
is abetted by, high rates of resource degradation;
and,
3) promote policies that encourage resilience and allow
agro-ecological systems to adapt to changing
external circumstances, such as droughts, floods,
etc. 300
Further, these objectives are then classed into three (3)
areas:
1) Correct valuation of resources, based on the
services they provide.
2) Set the right legal and social framework, so that
decisions based on full social costs of different
actions can be implemented.
3) Monitor changes in sectoral and national activities
and develop indicators of sustainability based on
298 Id.
299 Id., p.3.
300 Id., p. 6.
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those changes, so that policy makers can be properly
informed when making their decisions.
This type of "strategic planning" is, in Lee Kimball's view,
the "missing link" between past and current practices and
sustainable development."'
William R. Moomaw, writing for the Sustainability
Foundation, lists the following general strategies for
sustainable industrial practices. Note that many are
directly applicable to pesticide manufacturing and can
result in improved manufacturing and use practices which
translate to sustainable agricultural practices:
1) Reduce the amount of material required for the
manufacture of a product - dematerialization.
2) Reduce energy use in the production process.
3) Replace more hazardous or polluting materials or
energy sources in the manufacture or operation of a
product with environmentally less damaging
alternatives.
4) Use lower polluting fuels or shift to less
environmental impact energy technologies in
manufacturing.
5) Utilize waste materials from one stage of
manufacturing as raw materials for another.
6) Produce products that require less energy during
use.
7) Design products so that they can be reused or
upgraded rather than be thrown away when they become
obsolete.
8) Design products and materials so that they can be
301 Lee A. Kimall, note 147 supra, pp. 31-42.
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recycled.
9) Whenever it is not possible to recover materials,
create readily degradable or biodegradable products
or wastes that produce no toxics or accumulate
substances in the environment.
10) Implement product stewardship so that the life cycle
operations of the product produce minimal impact.
11) Shift from providing products to supplying services
(i.e. replace pesticides with pest management
services).3"
Investments in sustainable agriculture must include some
form of environment impact assessment.30 3 In this process,
the WB can play a critical role. "[I]nternational banks have
four instruments that can be used to assist in converting
the region's agriculture: macroeconomic policy adjustment
and institutional reform operations; sectoral operations
within agriculture itself; investment projects and programs;
and support for both public and private agricultural and
302 William R. Moomaw, Sustainable Industrialization:
Identifying the Factors, prepared for the First International
Program on the Management of Sustainability, Sustainability
Foundation, June 1994, pp. 8-9.
303 According to Markandya et. al. (note 289 supra), the
appraisal of projects related to irrigation, rangeland
management, wasteland development, clearance of wetlands,
[pesticide policies and practices] etc. all of which have been
carried out as part of the agricultural development of a
country, would be better designed and less likely to cause
environmental damages and sustainable development if the
evaluation process included both the valuation methodologies
described above as well as the use of sustainability criteria
based on threshold effects and safe minimum standards. p. 11.
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research programs."3 0 4 The most well known international
bank is the WB. The strength of the bank "stems from its
multilateral character; periods of imaginative and creative
leadership backed by a large, mostly competent technical
staff; and, of course, substantial financial resources. 305
The bank's initiative in agriculture started with the
creation of the Consultative Group for International
Agricultural Research ("CGIAR"), and at least 25% of the
bank's investments in LDCs recent years have been for
agricultural projects.36
Many academics and experts in the area of agriculture
believe that sustainable agriculture can only be achieved
through the complete overhaul of the current agricultural
system and the centralization of policy and implementation
functions. C. Valencia30 ?, states for example that:
it is necessary to reform the entire policy structure,
including policies within agriculture and those which are
external to the sector and which directly affect
304 Id., 16. See also: World Bank Development Report, 1993.
30s Montegue Yudelman, The World bank and Agricultural
Development - An Insider's View, World Resources Institute,
December 1985, p.11-12.
306 Ambuj D. Sagar, Pest Control Strategic: Concerns, Issues,
and Options, Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Vol. 11,
1991, p. 275-276, citing, Weir, D. and Shapiro,M. 1981, Circle
of Poison:Pesticides and People in a Hungry World, Institute
for Food and Development Policy, San Francisco, CA, 1981, and
World Resources 1988-89, Basic, New York.
307 C. Valencia, Sustainable Agriculture: Policies and
Institutions, in Markandya et. al., note 289 supra, p. 15.
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sustainable agriculture... [I]t is important to create a
senior-level governing body with authority to promote
policies and practices in all sectors of the economy.
Progress towards sustainable agriculture is seen as
passing through three stages: reform, transition and
stabilization. This phase-in time frame is needed to
apply the principle of adaptive change, rather than
destructive change. This becomes imperative because the
charges will be carried out not by the public sector, but
by the private sector, represented by the farmers
themselves. The intent is not to eliminate existing
public institutions altogether, but rather to adapt the
most important of these to the processes and practices of
sustainable agriculture. The existing system must be
modified to meet the requirements of the future. A major
effort is required from regulatory agencies within the
public sector in order to minimize market imperfections
and take account of the externalities that effect the use
of natural resources.308
Rola and Pingali,309 make specific recommendations for
change in the current system - in their view sustainable
agriculture includes: 1) elimination of prophylactic
chemical control; 2) a return to natural methods of pest
control; 3) varietal resistance; 4) cultural control;
integrated pest management, and 5) economic analysis of crop
protection technologies.
Elimination of Prophylactic Chemical Control
308 Id. p. 15; See also: Edward A. Parson and David G. Victor,
Governance for Environment and Sustainable Development, United
Nations University Press, 1993, pp. 1-30.
309 Agnes C. Rola and Prabhu L. Pingali, Pesticides, Rice
Productivity, and Farmer's Health: An Economic Assessment,
International Rice Research Institute, World Resources
Institute, 1993, p. Id., p. 19.
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Elimination of prophylactic chemical control, which
involves "calendar-based pesticide application, with no
consideration for pest density or anticipated crop loss,310
is important to any attempt to implement safe pest
management and sustainable agriculture practices. Notably,
this type of pest control has been associated with
destruction of other beneficial (predator) species;
resurgence of the treated pest populations; outbreaks of
secondary pests; residues in feed, food, and environment,
and farmer illnesses from prolonged exposure to
pesticides. 1 In their article Pesticides, Rice
Productivity and Health Impacts in the Philippine,n 3 2 Agnes
Rola and Prabhu Pingali, report that:
[t]he Philippines uses less pesticides than many
countries, but half of what it does use is concentrated
on rice production. Concern about rice pesticides in the
Philippines centers on their threat to human safety,
ecological balance, and productivity. Prophylactic
treatment early in the season disrupts the paddy
ecosystem's natural ability to cope with pest
infestations, so that later it is more susceptible to
pest damage (emphasis added) . Unsafe techniques for
applying these highly toxic chemicals impair human
health. Both side effects cut productivity.3
310 Id., See also: K.L. Heong, An Analysis of Insecticide Use
in Rice: Case Studies in the Philippines and Vietnam,
International Journal of Pest Management, Vol. 40.No. 2, 1994.
311 Id.
312 Agnes Rola and Prabhu Pingali, note 309 supra, p. 47; See
also: Ambuj D. Sagar, Pest Control Strategies: Concerns,
Issues, and Options, Environmental Impact Assessment Review,
Vol. 11, 1991,.p. 257-279.
313 Id.
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Natural Control
Rola and Pingali define natural pest control as "the
conservation of natural enemies by preventing destruction or
preserving their habitats.,3 14 Further:
choice of plant varieties, maintenance of alternative
hosts, and proper soil management are among the tactics
employed to keep beneficial species active and populous
enough to control pests. Some evidence also suggests
that increasing crop diversity through intercropping or
polyculture reduces damage from insect pests by providing
habitat for natural enemies. To be successful, natural
control should be practiced at the community level, where
predator populations are maximized.31 s
Varietal Resistance
As the term implies, varietal resistance involves the
generation of varieties of plants/crops which are resistant to
major insects and diseases. Rola and Pingali identify two
approaches currently being used for improving yield stability
through durable resistance to diseases and insects: 1) the
314 Agnes C. Rola and Prabhu L. Pingali, note 296 supra, p.
19.
315 Id., p. 20.
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alien gene transfer, and 2) the use of novel genes.3 16  They
also note that there is integration between natural pest
control and varietal resistance based on their
compatibility.31
Cultural Control
"By definition, cultural control includes the physical
manipulation of insect environment and excludes application of
chemical pesticides or introduction of resistant varieties or
natural enemies of pests. "318 Practices for cultural control
include cultivation and rotation, timing of planting and
harvesting, and variation of plant density and nutrient
use. 319
Integrated Pest Management
Integrated pest management ("1IPM") is one of the critical
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id., p. 21.
319 Id., p. 20-21.
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components of sustainable agriculture and safe pest
management. "In IPM, both the crop and pest are seen as part
of a dynamic agroecosystem. [It] attempts to capitalize on
natural biological factors that limit pest outbreaks, only
using chemicals as a last resource." 320  "[It is Ibased on
the idea that below a certain pest population density or
economic threshold, the cost of control measures exceeds the
value of losses from pests.321 Further, "the goal is to
reduce crop damage to a level where it is economically
tolerable, using control measures whose cost, both economic
and ecological, is not excessive.322 At farm level, pest
management decisionmaking is determined by a least three
factors: the nature of the pest attack and the damage it
causes, the range of protection measures and information
available to farmers, and farmers' objectives. " 323
320 World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-95: A
Guide to the Global Environment, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1994, p. 115, citing, FAO, Report of the First
Session of the FAO Panel of Experts on Integrated Pest
Control, (FAO, Rome, 1967), pp. 2-3, as cited in Michael
Hansen, Escape for the Pesticide Treadmill: Alternatives to
Pesticide in Developing Countries (Institute for Consumer
Policy Research, Mount Vernon, New York, 1987), pp. 33-34.
321 Id. p. 115.
322 Id., p. 115. See also: Ambuj D. Sagar, note 289 supra,
pp. 257-279. Sagar points out that the two major factors
that contribute to the costs of a pesticide are the initial
research and development expenses as well as the complexity
of the eventual manufacturing process; p. 265.
323 Agnes C. Rola and Prabhu L. Pingali, note 296 supra,
p. 23.
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IPM methods include "crop rotation, planting more than one
crop, early or delayed planting to protect a crop during the
most vulnerable stages of growth, manipulation of water and
fertilizer, field sanitation (such as plowing under harvest
stubble to remove pest hideaways), and the use of 'trap crops'
to lure pests away from the main crop."324  Biological
control is an important IPM method of safe pest management.
It "employs natural predators, parasites, and diseases to keep
pest populations below harmful levels. " 325
IPM methods have been successfully implemented in many
LDCs. It is strongly advocated by the FA 326  (IPM
Manifesto), and its use is expanding. For example, much has
been written regarding the success of IPM programs in
Indonesia, the Philippines, Mali and the Sudan.327
324 World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-95: A
Guide to the Global Environment, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1994, p. 115.
325 Id., p. 115. For-example, India, China, and a number of
other countries raise the parasitic wasp Trichogramma in
commercial facilities and release it to control corn,
cotton, rice, and sugar cane pests.
326 Global IPM, FAO Intercounty Programmes for IPM on Asia,
Manila, Philippines, 1993; Elsa Nivia, Informe: Reunion
Global Sobre MIP, PAN Latin America Regional Center, Palmira
Colombia, September 1993.
32 7See: Agnes C. Rola and Prabhu L. Pingali, note 296 supra,
Chapter 7, IPM Implementation in the Philippines, pp. 65-
78, and World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-95:
A Guide to the Global Environment, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1994, Box 6.1, Pest Control Without Pesticides:
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To promote sustainable agricultural practices, and to
implement IPM on a global scale, Ambuj Sagar, in a 1991
article recommends the following:
1) The FAO could set up research institutes to help in
the design and implementation of IPM programs, as part
of the overall sustainable agriculture programs. An
especially important role for the FAO would be
assisting in transferring technology to developing
countries that may not have the resources or the
scientific base required for such an activity.
2) For similar reasons, the WHO through its public health
programs should help to incorporate the relevant
features of IPM, such as biological control, into
vector control.
3) International development organizations such as the
World Bank, and the supplementing regional development
banks should develop policies in which the guarantee
of an agricultural loan is contingent upon the use of
the most sustainable agricultural policies possible,
including those for pest control. This would force
implementation of, not just suggest an emphasis on,
the pertinent IPM policies. A strong impact on
agriculture in the developing world would be
expectable since the World Bank provides about 25
percent of all the multilateral assistance to these
countries. About a fourth of the Bank's total aid is
for agricultural projects.
4) A protocol to control exports of a pesticide from a
country in which it is banned should be developed.
Not adhering to this could lead to imposition of trade
sanctions against that country.
Indonesia's IPM Success, p. 116; Pesticide Action Network,
IPM and Pesticide Use in Mali and Sudan, PANNA, September
21, 1992.
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Within individual countries also, substantial efforts need to
be made to deal with the problems [of pest control]:
1) The number of unintended poisonings from pesticides
can be drastically reduced by increasing the awareness
of the health hazards from pesticides for the general
populace. Such education, along with the precautions
to be taken to reduce these hazards and the necessity
of medical attention upon exposure, is especially
necessary for workers exposed to pesticides, their
supervisors, and employers. Such simple steps can go
a long way in reducing pesticide-related health
problems. Through educational and regulatory measures
in rural China, the incidence of poisoning reduced
from 4.5 to 0.1 percent within two years despite a 13-
fold increase in pesticide use.
2) In many developing nations, the governments provide
subsidies for pesticides in order to encourage their
use in agriculture. This often results in the
application of pesticides even when it is not
particularly beneficial to do so, at great costs to
their efficacy, as well as to the environment and
human health. It is imperative that such well-meaning
but harmful policies be reexamined and eliminated (or
at least attenuated) wherever possible. Instead,
programs should be established to educate farmers and
agriculturists about integrated pest management in an
alternate, more desirable approach of managing pests.
Care should be taken to point out the numerous
successful applications of IPM all of which have
resulted in much more effective, and more economic
pest control with reduced harm to human health and
environment.
3) Since IPM programs are implemented over large areas,
some form of regional cooperation is required between
farmers. This is particularly true for the many
biological control and cultural practices.
Participation in these programs also helps by
distributing the costs (such as monitoring and expert
advice) over a larger number of farmers, thus reducing
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the expenses per benefiting farmer.328
Technology
Although technological development in agriculture is the
root cause of current pesticide misuse and abuses in the
world, it is also the key to resolving the many problems of
the adverse human health and environmental consequences of
pesticide usage, and in promoting sustainable agriculture.
What is required is that the old and new technologies be
"harnessed. ,329
Developed countries and multinational corporations are
"powerful agents of technology transfer to developing
countries in all its various forms: patents, licenses,
marketing and distribution agreements, information,
educational programs, as well as direct foreign investment in
328 Ambuj D. Sagar, note 306 supra, p. 275-276, citing, Weir,
D. and Shapiro,M. 1981, Circle of Poison:Pesticides and
People in a Huncry World, Institute for Food and Development
Policy, San Francisco, CA, 1981, and World Resources 1988-
89, Basic, New York.
329 George R. Heaton Jr. et. al, Missing Links: Technology
and Environmental Improvement in the Industrializincr World,
World Resources Institute, 1994, p. 1.
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plant and equipment through siting of manufacturing
facilities."33  In order to implement sustainable
agricultural programs, there must be policies in place to
prohibit the export of the so called "bad" technology to LDCs
- those harmful to human health and environment (e.g., banned
pesticides and the technological inputs to their manufacture),
and incentives to transfer technologies which promote
sustainability (i.e. IPM). Three powerful and growing
incentives are the fear of corporate liability for damages and
injuries which occur abroad from the use and misuse of their
products, growing regulatory pressure in the country of
manufacturer, and, of course, the public and company
shareholders.3 ' The environmental attitudes and actions of
multinational corporations are further influenced by NGO's,
industry organizations (nationally and internationally).
Finally, the foreign governments in which these corporations
do business and the foreign public (including NGOs) also
influence these corporations.332  In response, many
corporations are beginning to transfer the more stringent
330 Allen L. White et. al., Corporate Environmentalism in
Developing Countries: A Tale of Three Multinational,
International Environmental Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 4, Fall
1992, p. 338.
331 Charles R. Hadlock, Multinational Corporations and the
Transfer of Environmental Technology to Developing
Countries, International Environmental Affairs, Vol. 6, No.
2, Spring 1994, pp. 149-174.
332 Id., p. 157.
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health and safety practices of the DCs in which they are
headquartered to their foreign branches and customers. Other
environmental management tools include: training programs,
inspections and reviews, environmental audits, risk
assessments, personnel evaluations, written procedures and
policies.333  This will require joint partnerships and joint
implementation between the country and companies exporting the
technology and the recipient country.3 3 4
Technological innovation and technology transfers can
create incentives for parties to reach international agreement
on environmental issues, particularly in the case of reluctant
LDCs. Further, government regulation and policies can also
serve to promote technological innovation and to create
incentives for the transfer of technology: creation of
linkages between companies and potential customers in LDCs,
patent protections, research and development opportunities and
tax incentives, etc.33s
Biotechnology and Pesticides
The tools of modern biotechnology, which include genetic
engineering, cell and plant tissue culture, and enhancing
fermentations for mass-producing microorganisms, offer hope
to further expanding the global food supply while
lightening the environmental burden of modern agricultural
333 Id., p. 161.
334 Allen White et. al., note 330 supra, p. 347.
33s Carlo Carraro et. al, Technological Change, Technological
Transfers, and the Negotiation of International Agreements,
International Environmental Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer
1994, pp. 203-222.
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practices. In the near term, biotechnology may enhance
yields, bolster the pest and disease resistance of some
critical crops, improve the nutritional value of some
foods, and make others easier to process or less prone to
loss during harvesting or shipping. In the long term,
biotechnology could improve the tolerance of staple crops
to environmental stresses such as drought and enable some
plants to fix nitrogen in the manner of legumes. In
effect, if carefully applied, biotechnology could ease some
of the biological and environmental factors that now limit
production, while reducing the need for inputs such as
pesticides that carry a high price for both the farmer and
the environment . 36
Biotechnology remains an area of interest to the major
research-oriented agrochemical corporations, but few companies
expect it to take the place of traditional chemical research
in the foreseeable future. The exception to this may be
Monsanto, in terms of bio-pesticides,3 3 7 and Zeneca, in terms
of seed research.
One of the problems already identified with biotechnology
and biopesticides is their potential to replicate and disperse
throughout an ecosystem, increasing the risks that they will
interact with nontarget organisms. 3 " The Union of Concerned
Scientists ("Union"), an NGOs made up of over 10,000
scientists and doctors, is perhaps the most vocal opponent of
336 World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-95: A
Guide to the Global Environment, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1994, p. 118.
3? Pesticide Action Network, Global Pesticide Market review,
PANNA, January 12, 1994, citing, in part, John McDougall
and Matthew Phillips, The World Agrochemical Market
Chemistry & Industry, Pesticide News, November 15, 1993.
338 H. Alan Wood and Patrick R. Hughes, Biopesticides,
Science, Vol. 261, July 16, 1993, p. 277.
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United States governmental recent approval of the production
of certain genetically engineered crops. For example, Dr.
Jane Rissler, spokesperson for the Union, publicly criticized
EPA's recent decision to allow Monsanto to produce a
genetically altered potato designed to kill insect pests that
feed on them,339 and EPA's and FDA's similar decisions
regarding squash34 0 , soybeans34 1 , cotton34 2  and corn. 3
The Union argues that these decisions are premature, and, that
approval decisions are being rushed "in deference to industry
requests." 4  More importantly, "[w]idespread use of these
crops could lead to the loss of most valuable biological
pesticides, 3 among other adverse ecological consequences.
Others argue that herbicide tolerant crops,' a current area of
agricultural biotechnology, will not support sustainable
agriculture. Instead, it "will take agriculture further away
from sustainable practices at precisely the time they are most
3" EPA Approves Genetically Altered Crops, The New York
Times, April 11, 1995.
340 Robert Greene, Virus Resistant Squash is Cleared by EPA,
The Associated Press, December 14, 1994.
341 Robert Greene, Agriculture Department Approves Engineered
Soybean, The Associated Press, June 2, 1994.
342 Scientists Protest USDA's Approval of Genetically
Engineered Cotton, PR Newswire, February 16, 1994.
34 EPA Approves Genetically Altered Crops, note 339, supra.
3 Robert Green, Approval Expected for Pesticide-Producing
Plants, The Associated Press, April 1, 1995; Engineered
Insect-Killing Crops Will Accelerate Pest Immunity, Says
Union of Concerned Scientists, U.S. Newswire, March 31,
1995.
3s Id.
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needed. "3 " "The potential problems of interactions between
microbial insecticides and nontarget organisms are
particularly important in considering the development of
genetically enhanced microbial insecticides such as
recombinant baculoviruses.347  "Most will be intended for
good purposes, but can exhibit unpredicted behavior upon
release. ,311
Further, " [t] raditional practices have already created
environmental mistakes. From gypsy moths to kudzu, we have
experienced both purposeful and accidental introduction of
'exotic' species that have spread with disastrous results.
Genetic engineering will permit the creation of hundreds of
thousands of organisms that will be in some sense exotic
everywhere on this planet. Some of these may have unexpected
and harmful consequences. " 349
Research and Development in Safer Pest Management Chemicals
and Technologies
In spite of increased research cost [experienced by
agrochemical producers], there is very little likelihood of
346 National Wildlife Federation, Biotechnology's Bitter
Harvest: Herbicide-Tolerant Crops and the Threat to
Sustainable Agriculture.
347 Id., p. 277.
348 Statement of Howard Ris, Executive Director, Union of
Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, February 1993.
349 Id. His references the National Wildlife Federation
report by Margaret Mellon and Jane Rissler entitled Perils
Amidst the Promise, WWF, which analyzes the environmental
risks of genetically engineered crops and calls for a
comprehensive regulatory structure. Many of the issues
addressed in the report are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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a surge in novel products. After nearly 50 years of
research, most modern synthetic insecticides are still
derived from just three chemical classes --
organophosphates, carbamates and pyrethroids. According to
industry observers, most research will generate support for
existing products, aiming to maximize their potential and
introduce lower dose-rate formulations. Increasingly,
companies tailor their range of products to promote use as
part of IPM programs, encouraging the view that pesticides
are central to the agenda for sustainable agriculture
(emphasis added). older products are relaunched in this
manner, for example, Hoescht's [ a Germany chemical
manufacturer] endosulfan, an organochlorine with growing
sales in developing countries. 3 so
The pesticide convention negotiations must include
incentives for DCs and LDCs to participate. In the case of
DCs, particularly, who are generally ahead in technological
and scientific advancements, incentives must be created for
DC companies to research and market safe pest management
programs. Effective incentives typically come in the form
of research grants, good press, patent protections, and,
favorable trade policies, among others.
New, safe technologies will help to dispel the wide view
that chemical pest management is the cornerstone to
sustainable agriculture.
Return to Tradition: Changing Focus from Non-Traditional
Cash Crops As A Method to Promote Sustainable Agriculture.
Cash crops programs in LDCs are at opposite to
350 Pesticide Action Network, Global Pesticide Market Review,
PANNA, January 12, 1994, citing, in part, John McDougall
and Matthew Phillips, The World Agrochemical Market,
Chemistry & Industry, Pesticide News, November 15, 1993.
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sustainable agricultural practices. Kevin Barrett and Bruce
Barrett present in their article entitled Poisoning
Guatemala,3 5 1 a comprehensive picture of what can happen to
farmers and the local economy in LDCs when the national and
local government and foreign assistance agencies such as
AID, the IMF, and the WB promote programs and policies which
support non-traditional cash crops for export markets.
According to Barrett and Barrett in Guatemala:
[s]ince the mid-1980s, [AID] has been trying to
convince small farmers to plant non-traditional cash
crops like snow peas, broccoli, and melons instead of
the traditional food staples of corn, beans, and
squash. The idea is for the cash crops to be sold
abroad, primarily in the U.S., as Yankee dollars will
flow into the Guatemalan economy, speeding debt
payments and leading to integration with the world
market... The carrot has been plenty of credits and
loans to farmers who try to grow cash crops, along with
lavish doses of foreign aid for the Guatemalan
government and military. The stick: threats to withhold
aid and apply trade sanctions if U.S. free-market
prescriptions are not followed.5 2
Barrett and Barrett point to two main negative ramifications
of Guatemala's cash crop program: 1) economic
dislocation 313 ; and 2) increased pesticide use and
351 Kevin Barrett and Bruce Barrett, Poisoning Guatemala,
Progressive Review, June 1994.
352 Id.
3 Id. Small farmers who choose to grow non-traditional
export crops are taking a major risk. They usually find
themselves deeply in debt after purchasing the necessary
seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides. If the crop doesn't come
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exposure. With regard to the later, Barrett and Barrett
report:
lavish doses of pesticides necessary to produce non-
traditional crops may be poisoning [Guatemalan farmers]
en mass. Crops like broccoli, snow peas and cantaloupe
were developed in northern climates, where harsh
winters keep insects under control. In Central
America, where freezes are unknown, copious and
repeated applications of insecticides are necessary to
grow export-quality produce. (The traditional food
crops of corn , beans, and squash, by contrast, have
evolved natural resistance to local insects and
therefore don't require pesticides; moreover, in
combination they offer a nearly perfect diet providing
a balanced source of protein, calories, and
vitamins. )"34
Both the short and long run utility of cash crop policies
and practices do not support sustainable agriculture as the
environmental impact of pesticides use and crop failures are
not factored into the goal of sustainable agriculture (to
maintain productivity and farm profitability while
minimizing environmental impacts) . Guatemala is but one
example of this policy gone haywire. Cash crop programs in
Kenya355 and other LDCs reveal the same problems.
in, if market prices drop, or if the crop is rejected due to
cosmetic flaws or unacceptable levels of pesticide residues,
the farmers may have their land confiscated by the local
bank or credit agency, to be resold to one of their
wealthier neighbors.
35 Id.
3ss See: M.A. Mwanthi and V.N. Kimani, Agrochemicals: A
Potential Health Hazard Among Kenya's Small-Scale Farmers,
in Impact of Pesticide Use on Health in Developing
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NGO Role in Sustainable Agriculture
In October 1994, NGOs from 16 different African nations
met in Mali to discuss sustainable agriculture and
alternatives to chemical pesticides in Africa. One of the
main topics of discussion was pest management practices
surrounding cotton production in Sub-Saharan Africa.116
Importantly, the Pesticide Trust (UK) in conjunction with
the Pesticide Action Network (U.S.) has developed the
Pesticide Trust's Cotton Cooperation Project.5 7 NGOs such
as Greenpeace, the Pesticide Action Network (See Chapter
III) will play key roles in the design, development, and
implementation of sustainable agricultural practices and
programs.
Conclusions: Future Prospects
The future for sustainable agricultural practices look
bright. Many are currently available and most have notable
records of success. Additionally, most alternative pest
management programs translate into both short-term and long-
term cost savings to everyone involved: industry,
governments, farmer, etc. Therefore, it is anticipated that
Countries, G. Forget, et.al (eds.), International
Development Research Centre, 1993.
356 Pesticide Action Network, Africa NGOs Meet on Pesticides
and Sustainable Agriculture, PANNA, January 10, 1995.
35 Pesticide Action Network, International Cooperation on
Sustainable Cotton Production, Pesticide News, December 26,
1994.
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most parties to the pesticide convention will embrace
sustainable agricultural practices and alternatives to
traditional pest management. However, these programs
require time to implement, and require a commitment by the
parties to the provision of resources for their
implementation.
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CHAPTER VII - Conclusions and Recommendations for
Negotiation of the Framework Convention on Pesticides
I. Introduction
A negotiated convention must include a clear statement
that its objectives are to mitigate, to the extent
practicable, the adverse human health and environmental
consequences of pesticide use and abuse, particularly in
LDCs, which effects are detailed in Chapter II. Further, it
must also state that its objective is to be achieved not
only through a system of pesticide regulation, but, more
importantly, through the eventual implementation of
sustainable agricultural practices. This is the most viable
means to correct the overuse and abuse of pesticides in
agricultural production.
The international harmonization of the definition of a
pesticide... and the establishment of an international
regulatory system (Chapter VI) are key objectives of the
proposed convention. This part of the convention (generally
included in the form of annexes) will be the most difficult
to formulate, and is the most important for the successful
implementation of the agreement. Attention should focus on
358 See: F. Schmidt-Bleek and M.M. Marchal, Comparing
Regulatory Regimes for Pesticide Control in 22 Countries:
Towards a New Generation of Pesticide Regulation, Regulatory
Toxicology and Pharmacology, Vol. 17, pp. 277-279.
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negotiating a legally binding, fluid, implementable
agreement, inclusive of the parties issues and interests.
II. Some Recommendations for the Pesticide Negotiations
However, specific recommendations can be made. First,
the convention's focus must be three-fold: 1) the outright
ban on the trade in banned and canceled pesticides; 2) the
establishment of an international regulatory system for all
other pesticides traded; and 3) the development of
mechanisms to implement alternative, safe, pest management
practices, which incorporate existing and evolving
sustainable agricultural practices. (See Chapter VI).
The goal of alternative, safe pest management through
sustainable agricultural practices is a key component of the
proposed convention. As specified in Chapter VI, many
sustainable pest management practices already exist in
agriculture. What is required under the convention is the
development of a mechanism to transfer both knowledge and
sustainable technologies between the parties. To achieve
this objective, the negotiators of the pesticide convention
should look to existing institutions which have experience
in the design and implementation of sustainable agricultural
policies and programs (See Chapter III). Most important is
the design and implementation of mechanisms to effect these
transfers, both financial and technical.
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Borrowing from the Good
As highlighted in Chapter IV, the negotiation process
will be complex, even with significant preparation. Much
has been learned from past experience in the negotiation
process over international environmental issues. The key
point learned is that they are highly complex, and evolving.
Another important point is that past failures do not
translate into a recommendation to dispense with all past
practices; this thesis does not advocate reinventing any
wheels. The United Nations negotiation process should be
followed, with modifications as necessary. Moreover, it is
important to recognize and incorporate the "good" aspects of
these experiences into the pesticide convention's
negotiation process, and to eliminate the "bad".
Specifically, the pesticide convention should borrow certain
good components of regional environmental agreements which
have attempted to regulate the export of hazardous
chemicals, hazardous products and hazardous wastes, such as
Bamako and the Basel Convention. Further, important
provisions in international environmental agreements such as
the FCCC and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer (September 1987) should be included
in the proposed convention. Other than the important
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general requirements included in international
agreements,3 " the following are among the many good
specific aspects of the FCCC and the Montreal Protocol
conventions which have utility in the pesticide convention:
I) FCCC:
Article 3:
Section 1.
Section 3.
Principles
DCs lead in combating climate changes and
the adverse effects thereof - DCs should
expressly take the same lead in the
pesticide convention.
Parties should take precautionary measures
to anticipate, prevent or minimize the
causes of climate change and mitigate its
adverse impacts - the same precautionary
measures (i.e. alternative safe pest
management practices) should be included
in the pesticide convention.
Further, some form of "joint implementation, as
recommended by the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for the FCCC (Article 3, Section 3) may need to
be included in the pesticide convention.
Article 4:
Section 1.
Section 3.
Commitments
As in the FCCC, there should be express
recognition of the differentiated
responsibilities between parties, and
their specific national and regional
development priorities, objectives and
circumstances.
DCs should provide financial resources,
including the transfer of technology to
LDCs so that the convention can be
implemented.
35 These include ratification and entry into force
provisions, procedures for amendments, voting rights,
definitions, withdrawal, dispute resolution, etc.
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Article 5:
Article 6:
Article 8:
Article 9:
Article 10:
Article 11:
II. Montreal
Article 2
and 3:
Article 4:
Article 5:
Provisions for research and systematic
observation
Provisions for education and training, and
public awareness
Establishment of a Secretariat
Establishment of subsidiary body for
scientific and technological advice
Establishment of subsidiary body for
implementation
Establishment of a financial mechanism
(like GEF, discussed in Chapter III)
Protocol:
Control Measures and Their Calculation.
These provisions serve to ensure that the
parties to the Protocol keep updated data
and complete reports on its calculated
levels of consumption and production of
identified ozone depleting substances.
This helps to provide an accurate measure
of the decline, overtime of use and
release of these substances by specific
parties.
Similar control measures should be
included in the pesticide convention which
requires that parties collect data and
submit reports on their ban and phase-out
of pesticides and chemicals identified in
the convention.
Control of trade with non-parties. This
provision is an important component of the
Montreal Protocol and is a necessary
component of the pesticide convention.
Special situation of LDCs. This provision
serves a critical function in the
Protocol, albeit it is controversial. The
language in the Protocol which allows LDCs
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Article 6
and 7:
Article 9:
Article 10:
Article 13:
to comply with certain requirements later
than DCs must be modified in the pesticide
convention. First, all parties must
comply within the specified time frame
with the prohibition prohibiting the
export of banned and canceled pesticides.
Second, the special position of LDCs with
regard to lack of safe substitutes and
technology requires that a phased, country
or regionally specific targets and
timelines be designated for the
implementation of alternative, safe pest
management programs.
Assessment and review of control measures
and reporting of data will be critical
components of the pesticide convention, as
they are in all international
environmental agreements.
Research, development, public awareness
and exchange of information provisions
will be important components of the
pesticide convention.
Technical assistance from DCs to LDCs is
the crux for the successful implementation
of the convention. Thus, similar
provisions must be included in the
pesticide convention.
Financial provisions, such as the
establishment of a pesticide GEF, and
provisions for funding for the operation
of the pesticide convention should be
made.
IV. Conclusions
An international agreement on pesticides is long overdue.
This, however, is no justification for rushing to the finish
line and ending with an agreement plagued with problems
which haunt most existing regional and international
environmental agreements: 1) their non-binding nature;
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.....
2) limitations on membership; 3) lack of implementation;
and therefore 4) the lack of compliance and enforcement.
Given the current state of international awareness and
expressions of cooperation (more accurately, the lack
thereof), the 1997 target for the completion of negotiations
on the pesticide convention is unrealistic. Much of the
necessary pre-negotiation work has yet to begin. One
specific area of deficiency is the survey of prospective
parties' agricultural and pest management problems,
particularly amongst LDCs. Unless this is completed, the
objectives of the pesticide convention - to eliminate the
export of banned and canceled pesticides and pesticide
chemical, and the implementation of safe, alternative pest
management policies and programs - are likely to never be
met.
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